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LINCOLN AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Michael Stokes Paulsen*
INTRODucTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford' created a
crisis of judicial authority. For many, particularly those of the North,
who had grown accustomed to deferring to the Court's interpreta-
tions of the Constitution, the decision posed an enormous problem
for their views of the authority of the federal judiciary-as it likewise
should for us today. The grounds on which the Court rested its deci-
sion in Dred Scott were legally wrong, morally wrong, and seemingly
deliberately wrong. Indeed, the Court appeared gratuitously to have
gone out of its way to produce the most possible wrong that could be
packed into a single decision.
2
How should one respond to a decision like Dred Scott and others
that might be like it?3 What is the proper authority, within our consti-
tutional system, of wrongjudicial decisions, for future judicial cases
and for nonjudicial political actors? Are such interpretations of the
© 2008 Michael Stokes Paulsen. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Distinguished University Chair and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas
School of Law. I would like to thank the editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
extraordinary patience, extraordinary endurance, outstanding editing, and invaluable
research assistance. All errors remain mine.
1 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2 For a brief summary, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Deci-
sion of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 995, 1011-12 & n.39 (2003) [hereinafter
Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision]. The definitive treatment of the Dred Scott case
is DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTT CASE (1978). Ironically, the outcome of the
case may well have been defensible on other grounds, as I will argue in future work.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Was Dred Scott Rightly Decided? 2 (May 21, 2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Paulsen, Was Dred Scott Rightly
Decided?]; see also infra note 5.
3 Though Dred Scott was, in many ways, a singular judicial atrocity, there are
many similar such candidates. See Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 2,
at l001
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Constitution authoritative and binding on all other actors in our con-
stitutional system?
For such questions to make sense, one must be willing to assume
the ability to say that a judicial decision is, objectively, wrong. That is
what makes Dred Scott a useful paradigm case for considering the prob-
lem of judicial authority. Nearly everyone now agrees that, at least in
some significant respect, Dred Scott produced an interpretation of the
Constitution that was flatly and virtually indisputably wrong.4 The sit-
uation is far enough removed-150 years-to recognize that such a
conclusion is not merely partisan, or the trendy fad of the moment.
Dred Scott's interpretation of the Constitution was, simply put, objec-
tively wrong: no sound argument from the Constitution's text; no
legitimate inference from the Constitution's structure; and no logical
deduction from an authoritative political decision made in the history
of the adoption of the Constitution remotely supports the Court's
monstrous constitutional assertions. 5 The case thus frames the issue
4 See Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 271-72 (1997).
5 Note that it is the Court's interpretation of the Constitution in Dred Scott that is
wrong, not necessarily the result. See supra note 2. The Court's two main holdings-
that black Americans could not be citizens of the United States or of any state, and
thus could not bring suits in such capacity or possess any other constitutional rights;
and that the Missouri Compromise's prohibition of slavery in certain federal territo-
ries was an unconstitutional denial of the (substantive) "due process" right of white
citizens to own slaves-are wrong and almost ridiculous interpretations of the Consti-
tution. See Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 2, at 1011-12. There is a
plausible argument for the result, nonetheless, based on choice-of-law principles: A
Missouri (federal) court might validly apply Missouri substantive law to determine the
legal status (as slave or free) of a Missouri domiciliary suing in Missouri; and Missouri
law might well have determined, consistent with the Constitution, that Scott remained
a slave, having never perfected or obtained free status during his sojourns in Illinois
and Minnesota. See Paulsen, Was Dred Scott Rightly Decided?, supra note 2.
Professor Mark Graber's recent book on the case, MARx A. GRABER, DREo Scorr
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITTIONA EVIL (2006), advances the provocative thesis
that Dred Scott may have been rightly decided on its own terms: Chief Justice Taney's
opinion plausibly reflected the spirit of the pro-slavery accommodations the Framers
built into the Constitution and contemporaneous attitudes concerning race and slav-
ery. Id. at 28-83; see also Graber, supra note 4, at 280-315 (analyzing the criticisms of
Dred Scott). For reasons that would take me far afield from my purpose here, I believe
Professor Graber's rather idiosyncratic view is highly unsound, essentially replicating
Taney's errors but putting them in modern terms. Taney's opinion, among its many
faults, infers/creates a general rule, not present in the text (a constitutional right to
slavery in the territories), from specific rules that are present in the text but do not
reach that far (e.g., the Fugitive Slave Clause), and from assumed general intentions
not enacted into law. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 411. Taney's method is not
originalist textualism as that methodology is generally understood today. Rather, it is
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perfectly: what is the authoritative weight of an atrociously wrong
Supreme Court decision for future judicial cases, for the actions of the
constitutionally independent political branches of the national gov-
ernment, and for voters and citizens?
Abraham Lincoln wrestled with this question ofjudicial authority,
first, as an aspiring Republican politician in Illinois, hoping to attain a
seat in the United States Senate; then, a surprisingly few years later, as
President of the United States, presiding over the nation's deepest
constitutional crisis-a crisis fueled in part by the Dred Scott decision
and the Republican Party's (and Lincoln's) repudiation of it. Lin-
coln's answer to the problem of judicial authority was a hesitant, at
first moderate, at times inconsistent, but increasingly radical and com-
plete repudiation of the idea of judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation.
In this Article, I trace the development of Lincoln's stance on
judicial authority, and his eventual repudiation of judicial supremacy,
from his first major speech addressing the Dred Scott decision in 1857
(Part I), through the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 (Part II), the
presidential campaign and "secession winter" of 1860 (Part III), and,
finally, during Lincoln's presidency, from his first inauguration in
March 1861 to his assassination in April 1865 (Part IV). The moral of
this story, I conclude (Part V), is one I have advanced in other writing:
the President, and other nonjudicial political actors swearing an oath
to the Constitution and acting within the spheres of their separate
constitutional powers, are not constitutionally bound by erroneous
decisions of the Supreme Court that they in good faith conclude are
antithetical to the Constitution and harmful to the nation. 6
a poor caricature of today's original-meaning textualism. It more resembles the text-
as-springboard, penumbras-and-emanations approach of today's less text-bound
approaches. Graber, for his part, assumes the propriety of the latter approach, and
therefore finds it possible to defend Taney's opinion on those terms. See Graber,
supra note 4, at 280-315. I would find, quite the reverse, that Taney's manipulative
approach to legal texts illustrates the unsoundness of Graber's modern interpretive
views. For an explication and defense of original-meaning textualism, see Vasan
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Draft-
ingHistoy, 91 GEo. L.J. 1113, 1127-33 (2003).
6 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth ofMarbury, 101 MICH. L. REv.
2706 (2003) [hereinafter Paulsen, Irrepressible Myth]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Mer-
ryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZo
L. REv. 81 (1993) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Merryman Power]; Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217
(1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch]; Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1337,
1345-69 (1999) [hereinafter Paulsen, Nixon Now]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil
2oo8] 1229
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One may reject this proposition-nearly all constitutional schol-
ars, judges, and elected officials today do-but only by rejecting one
of Lincoln's most important political and constitutional positions, fun-
damental to everything else he said and did as President. Lincoln's
rejection both of Dred Scott specifically and more generally of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation was an essential part of the
platform on which Lincoln rose to national prominence and was
elected President. That stance, and Lincoln's election on such a plat-
form, was featured among prominent Southerners' purported consti-
tutional justifications for secession: the nation had just elected a
lawless, anticonstitutional President who would invade the South's
constitutional rights, as duly determined by the United States
Supreme Court, with respect to slavery.7 The decision by Lincoln and
the Union to fight secession thus depends, for its legitimacy, on a
rejection of the Southern position on the legitimacy of Lincoln's con-
stitutional views.
The judicial supremacist stance accepted by most people today is
the anti-Lincoln stance. It is the position of Lincoln's early political
arch-adversary, Senator Stephen Douglas, in support of the binding
authority of Dred Scott and of any subsequent decision of the Supreme
Court extending slavery throughout the nation.8 And it is the posi-
tion of Jefferson Davis and the South, in opposition to the constitu-
tional legitimacy of a President and party elected on a platform of
opposition to the controlling force of the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tions of the Constitution. 9 In short, if the Douglas-Davis view is
right-that judicial decisions bind subsequent judicial actors, and all
political actors-then Lincoln was wrong in nearly everything he
stood for. Indeed, Lincoln's election as President rested on funda-
mentally anticonstitutional premises. Ifjudicial supremacists are cor-
rect, the South was not only within its rights in seceding, but did so for
just constitutional cause-rebelling against an administration and gov-
ernment premised on a grave breach of the Constitution.
War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 695, 712-20 (2004) (book
review) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation].
7 See infra Part III.
8 See, e.g., Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Jonesboro, Illinois (Sept. 15, 1858)
[hereinafter Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate], in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 586, 633-34 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter
LINCOLN 1832-1858] (reply of Mr. Douglas).
9 See infra Part III.
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I. 1857: LINCOLN'S RESPONSE To DRED ScoTr
On March 6, 1857, the United States Supreme Court dropped a
constitutional bombshell on a divided nation. In Dred Scott, the Court
held, in a suit for freedom by a Missouri slave whose master voluntarily
had taken him to a free state (Illinois) and to free federal territory
under the terms of the Missouri Compromise (present-day Minne-
sota) before returning to Missouri, that Dred Scott and his family were
not legally entided to freedom. 10 Chief Justice Roger Taney's outra-
geous opinion for the Court ranged broadly in its numerous pro-slav-
ery rulings, but the key holdings were two. First, the Court held that
Negroes, whether slave or free, could not, because of their race, be citi-
zens of the United States for any purpose under the Constitution."
This included the privilege to file lawsuits for freedom in the courts of
the nation (that is, federal courts) or to be counted as citizens of any
state for purposes of invoking the constitutionally authorized jurisdic-
tion of federal courts over suits between citizens of different states.
12
(Dred Scott had invoked the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts
after an unsuccessful suit against a different defendant in Missouri
state courts.) 13 The Court held, infamously, that the Constitution was
framed for the benefit of the white race only.' 4 The black race was
comprised of "beings of an inferior order" who were "unfit to associ-
ate with the white race, either in social or political relations."
15
Blacks, Taney wrote, had always been regarded by the Constitution as
having "no rights which the white man was bound to respect.'
16
Accordingly, "the negro mightjustly and lawfully be reduced to slavery
for his benefit."'17 Thus, not only were slaves unable to bring suits for
their freedom in federal courts, but free blacks also had no constitu-
tional rights that slave states were bound to enforce under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution.' 8
10 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 431, 454.
11 See id. at 404-07.
12 See id. at 430.
13 See id. at 398-401. The Missouri state court suit, in addition to being brought
against a different party, evidently never reached final judgment in the state court
system either. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 2, at 250-66. Apparently, under the law
ofjudgments at the time, the Missouri Supreme Court decision was not resjudicata as
against the later federal diversity action. See Paulsen, Was Dred Scott Rightly Decided?,
supra note 2, at 2-3, 9.




18 See id. at 404-07.
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In a second holding, the Court went on to rule, on the merits,
that neither the Federal Missouri Compromise nor Illinois state law
could confer freedom on Scott. 19 The Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional, Taney's opinion declared, because Congress consti-
tutionally could not violate slaveholders' constitutional rights to take
their slave property with them into federal territory and there legally
hold and possess such persons as property. Infamously and implausi-
bly, Taney located this substantive federal constitutional right to slav-
ery in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-the first
example in what would become a long line of instances in which the
Court would invalidate legislative enactments on the basis of notions
of "substantive due process." Taney wrote:
Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and
placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitu-
tion, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
and property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress
which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or prop-
erty, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed
no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name
of due process of law.
20
The invalidation of the Missouri Compromise had huge national
political consequences. Congress could not exclude slavery from pre-
sent or future federal territories and thus effectively could not prevent
such territories from seeking admission to the Union as slave states.
The ruling essentially declared the core principles of the new Republi-
can free-soil party unconstitutional. What's more, Taney's opinion
seemed to have gone a long way out of the way to reach out and
decide this issue: if it were really true that blacks could not be citizens
of the United States and therefore could not be citizens of any state
for purposes of bringing suit in federal courts founded on diversity
jurisdiction, then the federal courts were without jurisdiction and the
Missouri Compromise holding was unnecessary dictum. Moreover,
the Dred Scott opinion's final holding, that Illinois's free-state law did
not have extraterritorially binding effect on a Missouri adjudication of
Scott's status, would seem equally applicable to the Federal Missouri
Compromise statute, which contained a similar prohibition on slavery
infederal territory, but did not in terms purport to effect extraterritorial
19 See id. at 447-53.
20 Id. at 450.
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legal emancipation of slaves who had once set foot on free federal
soil.21
The Dred Scott decision provoked a firestorm of angry Northern
responses. 22 Lincoln was something of a late entrant, waiting several
months to digest the opinions and commentary and to weigh his own
response, 23 which he finally delivered in early summer at Springfield,
Illinois, on June 26, 1857.24 The speech was cast, in part, as a reply to
one by Stephen Douglas two weeks earlier-prefiguring the 1858 pat-
tern of the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates.2 5 Lincoln began by
addressing Douglas's positions on Utah and Kansas, using the former
situation to needle Douglas about his "popular sovereignty" stance of
territorial self-determination with respect to domestic institutions: why
should a territory be any less free to choose to permit polygamy than
to choose to permit slavery?26 After a few remarks on the "farce" of
the Kansas constitutional convention, Lincoln then turned to Dred
Scott, concisely setting forth the holdings and deftly setting aside
extended discussion of the merits:
And now as to the Dred Scott decision. That decision declares
two propositions-first, that a negro cannot sue in the U.S. Courts;
and secondly, that Congress cannot prohibit slavery in the Territo-
ries. It was made by a divided court-dividing differently on the
different points. Judge Douglas does not discuss the merits of the
decision; and, in that respect, I shall follow his example, believing I
could no more improve on McLean and Curtis, than he could on
Taney.2 7
21 As noted above, this ruling may in fact be right: the legal status (slave or free)
of a Missouri domiciliary, bringing suit in Missouri courts (state or federal) quite plau-
sibly could be thought governed by Missouri substantive law and Missouri choice-of-
law principles. See supra note 5. If free status had not been legally perfected in Illi-
nois or in Wisconsin Territory-if something more was required than breathing free-
soil air in order to create a status binding on Missouri under the Full Faith and Credit
or Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV-then there would be nothing
wrong with Missouri courts choosing to apply Missouri law to determine the Scotts'
status. And the Missouri Supreme Court had already determined that the Scotts
remained slaves under Missouri law. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852).
22 For samples of harsh, angry Northern commentary, see FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 2, at 417-32.
23 For Lincoln's lack of immediate response, see DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LIN-
COLN 199-201 (1995).
24 See Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illi-
nois (June 26, 1857) [hereinafter Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech], in LINCOLN
1832-1858, supra note 8, at 390.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 390-91.
27 Id. at 392.
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Lincoln correctly noted that the different holdings of Dred Scott
were supported by different groups of Justices, though as Professor
Fehrenbacher's magnificent study shows, Chief Justice Taney's opin-
ion for the Court was the opinion of the Court-reflecting the appar-
ent support or acquiescence of a majority for all its points.
2 8
McLean's and Curtis's dissents were long and powerful, emphasizing
different points. Lincoln took his audience to be familiar enough
with these arguments, and to be sympathetic to his position that the
majority opinion was simply wrong. Lincoln's concern in the speech
was a different issue: what is the binding force of an atrociously wrong
Supreme Court decision, where there exists widespread, vehement, and (by
assumption) legitimate popular dissent from it? Referencing Douglas, Lin-
coln immediately turned to this core issue: "He [Douglas] denounces
all who question the correctness of that decision, as offering violent
resistance to it. But who resists it? Who has, in spite of the decision,
declared Dred Scott free, and resisted the authority of his master over
him?" 29 Lincoln thus began by clearing away from the discussion any
suggestion that a final judicial decision is not binding in the particular
case, a concession he continually repeated in later years, most clearly
in his First Inaugural. 30 In the speech on Dred Scott at Springfield in
1857, Lincoln conceded explicitly that judicial decisions are binding
in this case-specific sense, but then quickly proceeded to question
whether they are binding in any other sense: 'Judicial decisions have
two uses-first, to absolutely determine the case decided, and sec-
ondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be decided
when they arise. For the latter use, they are called 'precedents' and
'authorities. "31 Lincoln's concern was with that second use of judi-
cial decisions: the force of precedent, as a judicial matter and as a
political matter, apart from deciding the specific case before the
Court.
We believe, as much as Judge Douglas, (perhaps more) in obe-
dience to, and respect for the judicial department of government.
We think its decisions on Constitutional questions, whenfully settled,
should control, not only the particular cases decided, but the gen-
eral policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amend-
28 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 2, at 322-34.
29 Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 392.
30 I shall return to this point below; it is one on which I disagree with Lincoln-
and on which, as it turned out, President Lincoln eventually ended up disagreeing, in
practice, with Senate-candidate Lincoln. See infra Part IV.A.
31 Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 392.
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ments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself.
More than this would be revolution.
32
The language I have italicized-" when fully settled'-sets forth an
important, subtle qualification (a classic Lincoln move) that weakens
dramatically the force of the apparent concession to judicial authority.
Lincoln then proceeded immediately to sketch out when decisions
should not be regarded as fully settled. That portrait leaves relatively
few situations in which resistance in fact would be "revolution."
Lincoln's first brush stroke, for example, was a broad one: is the
precedent an erroneous one which it would be open to the Court
itself to overrule? Lincoln set forth an instructive, sophisticated the-
ory ofjudicial stare decisis-better than anything the Supreme Court
has ever come up with, before or since. Lincoln's description cap-
tures well the reality of judicial practice and the limited nature of the
judicial commitment to precedent. To pick up the above quoted pas-
sage where we left off:
But we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the
court that made it, has often overruled its own decisions, and we
shall do what we can to have it to over-rule this.
We offer no resistance to it. Judicial decisions are of greater or
less authority as precedents, according to circumstances. That this
should be so, accords both with common sense, and the customary
understanding of the legal profession.
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous
concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias,
and in accordance with legal public expectation, and with the
steady practice of the departments throughout our history, and had
been in no part based on assumed historical facts which are not
really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the
court more than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed
through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, fac-
tious, nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent.
But when, as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to
the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not
even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite established a
settled doctrine for the country.
33
Here, in the space of barely more than two paragraphs, is a full,
practical treatment of judicial precedent. It has several distinct ele-
ments. First, precedents (as opposed to judgments) are not absolute.
34
32 Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added).
33 Id. at 393.
34 For a thorough, more recent defense of exactly this line, see Edward A. Hart-
nett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 123 (1999).
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No precedent is beyond the Court's power of reconsideration if the
Court becomes persuaded that the earlier decision was erroneous.
The Court has often been so persuaded, as Lincoln observed. Indeed,
what was true in Lincoln's day remains quite obviously true today: the
Court frequently overrules decisions it becomes persuaded were erro-
neous.35 Precedents are not sacrosanct.
Second, some judicial decisions obviously are entitled to less def-
erence than others. In Lincoln's words, cases are "of greater or less
authority as precedents, according to circumstances."3 6 This, Lincoln
observed, was consistent with both common sense and the tradition of
the legal profession.3 7 The extent to which a precedent commanded
unanimous or near-unanimous support among the Justices is a rele-
vant circumstance.3 8 Division, and especially partisan division, weak-
ens the force of precedent. The fact that a precedent decision was a
departure from "legal public expectation" or "steady practice" of the
government "throughout our history" also makes it less worthy of
respect and deference.3 9 And finally, it is important that a decision
not have been based on false premises-"assumed historical facts
which are not really true."40 If a decision fails on some or all of these
grounds, Lincoln maintained, there is nothing at all wrong with
regarding it as having not set forth a settled judicial rule.
41
35 Is it really necessary to collect examples? See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); see
also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("'(T] his Court has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent.'" (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944));
id. at 828 & n.1 (listing thirty-three previous Supreme Court decisions which had
been overruled). For further discussion, see generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abro-
gating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and
Casey ?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1537-51 (2000).





41 See id. Contemporary Supreme Court doctrine is similar to Lincoln's views in
some respects and different from his views in others. As to the degree of judicial
unanimity: where the Court had been and remains divided on an issue, the policy of
stare decisis is regarded as having a weaker application. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991) (treating the policy of adherence to precedent as weaker
when the precedent cases were "decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited
dissents"). As to legal public expectation: members of the Court sometimes have sug-
gested that stare decisis is weaker when the precedent under review had been a sud-
den and dramatic departure from legal expectation. See id. at 834-35 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing the majority's approach to stare decisis as "the application to
judicial precedents of a more general principle that the settled practices and expecta-
1236 [VOL. 83:3
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The third feature of Lincoln's theory of stare decisis is in some
ways the most interesting, and the most debatable: even where a deci-
sion is "wanting in some of these" features-that is, the precedent is
deficient in reasoning, support, consistency with past practice, con-
formity with present expectation, or factual integrity-if it "had been
before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and
re-affirmed through a course of years," it then "might be, perhaps
would be" factious or revolutionary not to acquiesce in it.42 Thus,
even badly wrong precedents, Lincoln seems to have said, sometimes
can acquire a status as settled, if consistently reaffirmed over a course
of years. An incorrect, astonishing departure from prior legal expec-
tation, made by a divided Court, and based on false factual premises,
may come to be regarded as settled precedent!
Lincoln did not quite go this far. As was his habit in preparing
and delivering written speeches, Lincoln was careful both to pepper
his more sweeping statements with briefly stated qualifications (leav-
ing him useful and necessary escape routes) and generally to refrain
from overstatement. His formulation thus should be read with care,
both for what it says and what it does not say. Lincoln did not say, for
example, that repeated reaffirmation definitively settles an issue, or
bars overruling, or establishes a particular interpretation as right. He
acknowledged only that, at some (unspecified) point, it "might," or
"perhaps would," become "factious" or "revolutionary" not to acqui-
esce. Note that Lincoln did not even say, at least not quite, that it
would be wrong or improper not to acquiesce; he concedes only that
one might fairly be regarded as inordinately contrary or obstinate-
tions of a democratic society should generally not be disturbed by the courts"); see also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231-34 (1995) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.) (defending the propriety of overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990), in part on the ground that it had been a departure from prior under-
standings). On the other hand, the Court sometimes has suggested precisely the
reverse, that dramatic departures from prior expectations acquire a "watershed" status
from which it would be politically improvident for the Court to retreat. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) ("[T]o overrule under fire in
the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would
subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question."). Finally, the Court has
consistently held that false, mistaken, or changed factual premises or predicates
weaken precedents' weight. See id. at 860-64 (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). For a thorough critique
of the modern judicial doctrine of stare decisis, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the
Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's
Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (symposium on
precedent and the Roberts Court).
42 Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 393.
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perhaps even downright rebellious-to persist in resisting, past some
reasonable cutoff point. Again, though, Lincoln did not say what that
cutoff point might be.
Lincoln's bow toward precedent served his rhetorical, and ulti-
mately political, purposes. As we shall see below, part of Lincoln's
political argument in the United States Senate campaign against
Douglas, a year later in 1858, would be that there was a real danger
that the Dred Scott decision might be reaffirmed and even extended to
require free states to tolerate slavery, if it was not opposed in the polit-
ical sphere. 43 The Supreme Court's decision might well become a set-
fled precedent if "sustained" at the polls, but would not so become if
rejected at the polls.
44
At Springfield in 1857, Lincoln's point was narrower-to defend
the propriety of not treating Dred Scott as the final, authoritative word
on the issues it addressed. 45 Lincoln's object was not to set forth a
comprehensive theory of when precedent must be obeyed, as if to per-
suade his audience that failure to follow judicial decisions was the
great evil to be remedied. Rather, he was giving up some ground in
order to set up his main point, drawing a pointed contrast between
Dred Scott and the possible claims of authority that other judicial
precedents might be thought to possess. 46 This is clear in Lincoln's
punch line to this passage: "But when, as it is true we find it wanting in
all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not
factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite
established a settled doctrine for the country."
47
That was Lincoln's point. Dred Scott should not be considered
authoritative, final, and binding, except with regard to the specific
case decided. It has been noted frequently by Lincoln scholars that
one of his preferred modes of argument, both as a lawyer and as a
politician, was to concede (or appear to concede, for the sake of argu-
ment) one or more minor points, in order to clear the case of distrac-
tions, to dismiss the point conceded as unimportant, or to set up a
43 See infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
44 SeeAbraham Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 16,
1858) [hereinafter Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech], in LINCOLN 1832-1858, supra
note 8, at 426, 430 ("This point is made, not to be pressed immediately; but, if acqui-
esced in for a while, and apparently indorsed by the people at an election, then to
sustain the logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with
Dred Scott, in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any
other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free State.").
45 See Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 391-403.
46 See id. at 393.
47 Id. (emphasis added).
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rhetorical contrast.48 Lincoln then would focus on his primary point,
having removed the obstacles and distractions in his path.
49
Lincoln's discussion of judicial stare decisis in his Springfield
speech on the Dred Scott case was precisely in this pattern. Bear in
mind that Lincoln was answering Douglas's charge of disrespect for
the judiciary. (In the next paragraph of the speech, Lincoln quotes
Douglas's position at length.) 50 That charge would have had consid-
erable political force. Lincoln did not want the charge to stick, and
was therefore perfectly willing to concede as much ground as he rea-
sonably could to judicial authority in order to maintain a moderate
stance and keep the focus on the propriety of refusing to acquiesce to
Dred Scott. He obviously wanted to deprive Douglas of the leverage of
being able to charge Lincoln with complete disregard for the judici-
ary. Accordingly, Lincoln placed the fulcrum as far toward Douglas's
position as possible, leaving Douglas no room to argue about anything
other than the binding, authoritative status of Dred Scott. As we shall
see, Lincoln continued this strategy in his 1858 debates with Douglas,
effectively pushing Douglas into the opposite extreme corner: com-
plete willingness to acceptjudicial decisions no matter what-no matter
how horrible they might be-including a decision forcing slavery
upon the whole nation, North as well as South.
5I
Lincoln's formulation of stare decisis in the Springfield speech is
thus best understood as stating a "safe harbor" in which disagreement
with Supreme Court precedent is unquestionably legitimate. His dis-
cussion of the status of judicial precedent is best stated as a negative
proposition about when precedent is not binding, which is the point
to which this passage is directed. The absence of a long period of
sustained judicial embrace of a questionable doctrine is an important
factor against according such decisions strong stare decisis weight.
While a case that has been reaffirmed often and regularly may enjoy
substantial deference-Lincoln does not actually concede that such
decisions are irreversible-a relatively recent case lacking such confir-
mation is certainly not entitled to any strong presumption of settled-
ness.
5 2
48 See, e.g., DOUGLAS L. WILSON, LINCOLN'S SWORD 143-61 (2006).
49 See id. (giviiig examples).
50 See Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 393-96.
51 See infra notes 107-73 and accompanying text.
52 Nothing in Lincoln's discussion forecloses the position that some judicial deci-
sions and doctrines might be so wrong as to be unworthy of the respect usually
accorded longstanding precedents. It is nearly inconceivable, for example, that Lin-
coln actually would have regarded Dred Scott as stating a settled rule even if the Court
had reaffirmed it in a series of subsequent cases. To be sure, he was very concerned
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Lincoln goes on to address the clash with Douglas's position.
'Judge Douglas considers this view awful."'53 He then quoted Doug-
las's position at length, as a counterpoise:
"The courts are the tribunals prescribed by the Constitution
and created by the authority of the people to determine, expound
and enforce the law. Hence, whoever resists the final decision of
the highest judicial tribunal, aims a deadly blow to our whole
Republican system of government-a blow, which if successful
would place all our rights and liberties at the mercy of passion, anar-
chy and violence. I repeat, therefore, that if resistance to the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in a matter like the
points decided in the Dred Scott case, clearly within their jurisdic-
tion as defined by the Constitution, shall be forced upon the coun-
try as a political issue, it will become a distinct and naked issue
between the friends and the enemies of the Constitution-the
friends and the enemies of the supremacy of the laws."
54
Lincoln's 1857 position, a position from which he never retreated
(but from which he did advance to a yet more aggressive stance in
later years),55 is best defined as the negation of the Douglas position.
For Lincoln, the Court's authority to interpret the law was not, as
Douglas had suggested, exclusive and supreme in the sense that no
other political authority legitimately could contest it. To disagree with
the Court on a constitutional matter of fundamental importance; to
resist its decision as precedent binding for all political purposes; to
seek to have it overruled, was not, for Lincoln, a "blow" to republican
government or a call for "passion, anarchy and violence. ' 56 To con-
test the authority and finality of Dred Scott as a rule binding the govern-
ment, and to make a political issue of disagreement, was not merely to
be an enemy of the Constitution; it was to be an enemy of the
to prevent such reaffirmations from occurring, recognizing that such a pattern of
decisions would make it increasingly more difficult to dislodge the original error, it
having then become more deeply entrenched. But that is different from conceding
that the error actually does become entrenched by repetition, in a way that all must
regard as binding and immune from reconsideration. To take a more modern exam-
ple, Plessy endured for fifty-eight years, and was a premise for many subsequent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
interred "separate but equal." Lincoln's speech on Dred Scott cannot fairly be quoted
as suggesting that the force of precedent should have required the Brown Court to
accept Plessy as settled and final.
53 See Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 393.
54 See id. (quoting Douglas).
55 See infra Part IV.
56 See Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 393.
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Supreme Court's decision. For Lincoln, there was nothing at all
improper about such a stance.
Lincoln then pointed out the inconsistency between Douglas's
position with respect to Dred Scott and his earlier position supporting
political repudiation of judicial decisions with which the Democratic
Party disagreed, including President Andrew Jackson's famous rejec-
tion of the Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland
57
upholding the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States.5 8
Lincoln skillfully turned these political precedents on Douglas, simul-
taneously converting them into affirmative support for Lincoln's own
position. How could it be said, as Douglas had, that opposition to the
Supreme Court's decision and refusal to be bound by it as a political
rule made one an enemy of the Constitution, when Jackson and Doug-
las had done precisely this on the Bank question?
59
Why this same Supreme court once decided a national bank to
be constitutional; but Gen. Jackson, as President of the United
States, disregarded the decision, and vetoed a bill for a re-charter,
partly on constitutional ground, declaring that each public func-
tionary must support the Constitution "as he understands it." But
hear the General's own words. Here they are, taken from his veto
message:
"It is maintained by the advocates of the bank, that its constitu-
tionality, in all its features, ought to be considered as settled by pre-
cedent, and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this
conclusion I cannot assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source
of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of
constitutional power, except where the acquiescence of the people
and the States can be considered as well settled."
60
Lincoln then quoted President Jackson's defense of the coordinate,
coequal authority of each of the branches of the national government
to interpret the Constitution, each for itself:
"If the opinion of the Supreme court covered the whole
ground of this act, it ought not to control the co-ordinate authori-
ties of this Government. The Congress, the executive, and the
court, must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Con-
stitution. Each public officer, who takes an oath to support the
57 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
58 Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 393-94; see McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 436-37.
59 See Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 393-94.
60 Id. (quoting Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILA-
TION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 581 (James D. Richardson
ed., Wash., D.C., Gov't Printing Office 1896) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]).
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Constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and
not as it is understood by others."61
AndrewJackson had achieved something of an iconic, almost leg-
endary status in American politics. Even among those who had dis-
agreed with the politics of Jackson's party, the Jackson name
commanded respect decades after his presidency. Lincoln's invoca-
tion of Jackson's stance was thus a useful rhetorical move, which he
employed to good effect against Douglas.
Again and again have I heard Judge Douglas denounce that bank
decision, and applaud Gen. Jackson for disregarding it. It would be
interesting for him to look over his recent speech, and see how
exactly his fierce philippics against us for resisting Supreme Court
decisions, fall upon his own head. 62
Thus, Douglas too, by his own standard, was guilty of having "fought
in the ranks of the enemies of the Constitution," and with none other
than the famed General Jackson himself.""
Lincoln's invocation of Jackson was more than just good political
jujitsu. On the question ofjudicial authority, Lincoln appears to have
fully embraced Jackson's position as his own, a pattern he repeated on
other important issues of presidential and national governmental
power a few years later when Lincoln, as President, followed Jackson's
stance on the indissolubility of the Union, the supremacy of national
authority over the states, and the propriety of using national power to
coerce state obedience. 64 On the matter of precedent and judicial
authority, it is striking how closely Lincoln's 1857 formulation paral-
leled Jackson's 1832 stance in the bank veto message: precedent
should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power,
except where public political acquiescence can be deemed well settled
(Jackson's words) .65 Where lacking the requisite claims to public con-
fidence, precedent should be treated as not establishing settled doc-
trine for the nation (Lincoln's words) .66 Except where fully settled by
broad, deep, universal acceptance, the Supreme Court's decisions do
61 Id. at 394 (quoting Jackson, supra note 60, at 582).
62 See id.
63 See id. at 395.
64 See 1 WILIAM J. BENNETT, AMERICA: THE LAST BEST HOPE 234-40 (2006) (dis-
cussing Jackson's position and noting its influence on Lincoln); JAMES M. MCPHER-
SON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 249-50 (1988) (comparingJackson's and Lincoln's view
on the authority and permanency of the Union and on federal power to coerce the
states).
65 SeeJackson, supra note 60, at 582.
66 See Lincoln, Dred Scott Speech, supra note 24, at 393; supra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text.
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not control the interpretation of the Constitution by other political
actors or by the people. 67 Each branch of government, each public
official, each voter, must be guided by the Constitution as he faithfully
understands it, not as it is understood by others.68
As we shall see, Lincoln refined and expanded this position in
subsequent years, becoming less and less reserved in its application.
But already by 1857, in response to the atrocity of Dred Scott, Lincoln
had firmly rejected the naive position of reflexive judicial supremacy
in constitutional interpretation and any notion that judicial decisions
are binding beyond the specific case decided. Instead, Lincoln
defended the propriety of political resistance to Supreme Court deci-
sions. This would become one of the distinguishing themes in Lin-
coln's famous debates with Douglas in the Senate campaign of 1858.
II. 1858: THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES
The central issue of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, indeed of the
entire 1858 Illinois senatorial campaign, was the proper stance of the
national government toward the expansion of slavery into federal ter-
ritories. Compressing almost ridiculously the most marvelous series of
formal political debates in American history: Stephen Douglas, the
incumbent and author of the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act 69 repealing
the Missouri Compromise's prohibition of slavery north of 36' 30",
argued that the question of slavery in the territories should be
resolved by local "popular sovereignty. '70 By this term Douglas meant
the right of the (white) people of each territory to decide for them-
selves whether or not to permit slavery, pending application for state-
hood. The federal government should not prohibit the introduction
of slavery into any national territory and should admit new states irre-
67 See Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and
Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 321-23 (2005).
68 See Jackson, supra note 60, at 582. The echoes of Andrew Jackson's position
can be heard quite distinctly in Lincoln's First Inaugural:
[I]f the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole
people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the
instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal
actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that
extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that emi-
nent tribunal.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) [hereinafter Lincoln, First
Inaugural], in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 215, 221
(Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter LINCOLN 1859-18651.
69 Ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
70 See, e.g., infra note 74.
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spective of whether they choose slavery or freedom. Any contrary
view, Douglas argued-such as the Republican Party's-was anti-
democracy, sectional, abolitionist, extremist, a threat to the peace of
the Union, and an embrace of the horrors of complete social equality
among whites and blacks.
71
What's more, Douglas maintained, such a position was an assault
on the Constitution, because contrary to its authoritative exposition
by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott. The Court's decision was binding,
Douglas argued. 72 While Dred Scott did not settle every question, the
Court's decision clearly denied congressional power to prohibit slav-
ery in the territories. The Republican stance, urging such a prohibi-
tion, was for Douglas the moral equivalent of resistance to the
Constitution itself, and a grave threat to constitutional government
and the rule of law. 73 (Douglas desperately, and unpersuasively, tried
to dodge the reality that Dred Scott also contradicted his "popular sov-
ereignty" stance, rendering popular choice a one-way street: the peo-
ple of a territory were free to choose slavery, but they were not free to
choose freedom.) 
74
71 See, e.g., infra note 164 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 135-36, 161-63 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., infra note 164 and accompanying text.
74 The Court had held that neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could
prohibit slavery in federal territory. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 451 (1857) ("And if Congress itself cannot [ban slavery in the territories]-if it is
beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government-it will be admitted, we
presume, that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise them.").
Lincoln, of course, noted the irony that Dred Scott skewered Douglas's position, too.
See Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech, supra note 44, at 429 ("Under the Dred Scott
decision, 'squatter sovereignty' squatted out of existence . . . ."); Abraham Lincoln,
Speech at Springfield, Illinois (July 17, 1858) [hereinafter Lincoln, Speech at Spring-
field], in LINCOLN 1832-1858, supra note 8, at 460, 464 ("[D]oes [Douglas] mean to
say that he has been devoting his life to securing to the people of the territories the
right to exclude slavery from the territories? If he means so to say, he means to
deceive; because he and every one knows that the decision of the Supreme Court,
which he approves and makes especial ground of attack upon me for disapproving,
forbids the people of a territory to exclude slavery.... He sustains the decision which
declares that the popular will of the territories has no constitutional power to exclude
slavery during their territorial existence."); Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note
8, at 617-20 (reply of Mr. Lincoln) (noting that Dred Scott held that neither Congress
nor territorial legislatures could exclude slavery from the territories).
In the second formal debate, at Freeport, Lincoln artfully put the question to
Douglas as his second "interrogatory": "Can the people of a United States Territory, in
any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery
from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?" Second Lincoln-Doug-
las Debate, Freeport, Illinois (Aug. 27, 1858) (hereinafter Second Lincoln-Douglas
Debate], in LINCOLN 1832-1858, supra note 8, at 537, 541-42 (speech of Mr. Lin-
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Lincoln, the challenger, argued for the restoration of the Mis-
souri Compromise, for the constitutional power of Congress to pro-
hibit slavery in the territories, and for the exercise of such power to
prohibit slavery in all territories, wherever possible. This was the core
of Lincoln's stance, and it flew squarely in the face of Dred Scott. Lin-
coln, an antislavery moderate, conceded both the right of states to
choose slavery, immune from federal interference, and the constitu-
tional entitlement of slaveholders to a Federal Fugitive Slave Act.
75
He also was prepared to concede, in the main, the inherent social and
political inferiority of African-Americans. 76 And he was, further, will-
coln). Douglas's confusing answer was "emphatically" that the people of a territory
could, "by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a
State Constitution." Id. at 551 (reply of Mr. Douglas). This was because "slavery can-
not exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless, it is supported by local police regula-
tions." Id. at 552. Such regulations required action by local legislatures. Thus, the
people might, by "unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of [slav-
ery] into their midst.... Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court
may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave territory
or a free territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill." Id. This
hypertechnical, implausibly narrow reading of Dred Scott, in order to save Douglas's
"popular sovereignty" position, may have been useful for the 1858 Illinois senatorial
campaign, but this "Freeport Doctrine" (as it came to be called), along with Douglas's
refusal to support congressional "slave code" legislation for the territories, contrib-
uted to Douglas's undoing with Southern Democrats in the 1860 presidential cam-
paign. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 2, at 494-96, 536-38.
75 Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 68, at 215-16 (Fugitive Slave Clause); id. at
222 (right of states to choose slavery); Seventh Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Alton, Illinois
(Oct. 15, 1858) [hereinafter Seventh Lincoln-Douglas Debate], in LINCOLN
1832-1858, supra note 8, at 774, 806 (reply of Mr. Lincoln).
76 Even our heroes have their cancers. See First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Ottawa,
Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858) (hereinafter First Lincoln-Douglas Debate], in LINCOLN
1832-1858, supra note 8, at 495, 511 (reply of Mr. Lincoln) ("This is the whole of it,
and anything that argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with
the negro, is but a specious and fantastic arrangement of words .... "); Second Lin-
coln-Douglas Debate, supra note 74, at 539 (speech of Mr. Lincoln) ("I think, under
the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern States are entitled
to a Congressional Fugitive Slave Law."); Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 8,
at 619-20 (reply of Mr. Lincoln) (acquiescing to the validity of the Fugitive Slave
Law); see also Fourth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Charleston, Illinois (Sept. 18, 1858)
[hereinafter Fourth Lincoln-Douglas Debate], in LINCOLN 1832-1858, supra note 8, at
636, 636-37 (speech of Mr. Lincoln) ("I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black
races.... [T]here is a physical difference between the white and black races which I
believe will for ever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and politi-
cal equality. . . . I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior
position assigned to the white race."). But see Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago,
Illinois (July 10, 1858) [hereinafter Lincoln, Speech at Chicago), in LINCOLN
1832-1858, supra note 8, at 439, 458 ("Let us discard all this quibbling about this man
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ing to countenance the admission into the Union of new slave states.77
But Lincoln insisted that slavery was wrong in principle, and should be
limited to where it already existed, whenever politically possible. The
Dred Scott decision was wrong, should be overruled, and should not be
regarded as a binding rule for the nation. Indeed, Lincoln argued,
the greater danger was that, if the Dred Scott decision were acquiesced
to and not challenged politically, the Court would extend the Dred
Scott decision and make slavery lawful, as a matter of constitutional
right, in Northern states as well as in the territories. 78 The tendency
was in such a direction, Lincoln argued. "'A house divided against
itself cannot stand,"' Lincoln stated, quoting Jesus. 79 "I believe this
government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half fee."
80
One of two things would happen. Either, by limiting the spread of
slavery into territories and new states, the institution would be set on a
course toward its gradual extinction, a process that probably would
take at least one hundred years; 1 or, by expanding its spread, the
Supreme Court, aided by willing and enthusiastic politicians, would
soon make slavery the national rule in America.8 2
It is no exaggeration to say that the meaning and authoritative
force of the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott was the crux of the
Lincoln-Douglas debates.8 3 If Douglas's view was right, the Court's
decision utterly foreclosed the Republicans' position and rendered it
an assault on the Constitution. If Lincoln's view was right, the Court's
decision was utterly wrong and was itself an assault on the Constitu-
tion, which it was not improper to resist with political force.
A survey of key passages from the 1858 campaign speeches and
debates illustrates the central points. There is much repetition, and
some refinement, of the respective positions of Douglas and Lincoln
during the course of the summer and fall of 1858. In the main, Lin-
coln's statements on the authoritativeness of judicial decisions built
and the other man-this race and that race and the other race being inferior, and
therefore they must be placed in an inferior position .... Let us discard all these
things, and unite as one people throughout this land, until we shall once more stand
up declaring that all men are created equal.").
77 See Second Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 74, at 538, 540 (expressing
reluctance, but willingness, to admit new slave states).
78 See infra notes 84-86, 109-15 and accompanying text.
79 Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech, supra note 44, at 426 (quoting Luke 11:17;
Mark 3:25; Matthew 12:25).
80 Id.
81 See Fourth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 76, at 677 (rejoinder of Mr.
Lincoln).
82 See id.
83 Accord FEHRENBACHER, supra note 2, at 485-96.
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on, and to a large extent simply repeated, the themes of his 1857
speech on the Dred Scott case. Douglas's position too remained largely
consistent. But under the press of each candidate's challenges
directed to the other, the respective positions became even more spe-
cific and crisply drawn.
It began at Springfield, with Lincoln's famous "House Divided"
speech on June 6, 1858, at the close of the Republican state conven-
tion naming him as their party's candidate for Senate. Lincoln's
theme was the specter of a tacit conspiracy to nationalize slavery. He
linked Douglas's Nebraska bill to the Supreme Court's decision in
Dred Scott, to the outgoing and incoming Presidents' prior endorse-
ments of the Court's decision, and to a possible "second Dred Scott'
case requiring Northern state acceptance of slavery. 84 "Such a deci-
sion is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the
States," 85 Lincoln said, and Douglas's position was preparing the pub-
lic mind to accept such a subsequent decision:
Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming,
and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political
dynasty shall be met and overthrown.
We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Mis-
souri are on the verge of making their State fre;, and we shall awake
to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave
State.
To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty, is the work
now before all those who would prevent that consummation.
8 6
84 See Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech, supra note 44, at 426-34. Many, if not
most, historians doubt whether a true "conspiracy" existed. See FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 2, at 438 (noting this view, but arguing that Northern fears of slavery nationaliza-
tion were justified); MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 180-81 (discussing the views of
historians, but siding with the plausibility of the Republicans' fears). It is clear, how-
ever, that President-elect Buchanan lobbied Northern Justices to join the Southern
majority in reaching out to declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional in
excluding slavery from northern territories. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 2, at
311-14. Buchanan was informed by Justice Grier of the result in advance, and
Buchanan called for acceptance of the Court's decision in his inaugural address, just
days before the decision was announced. See id. at 314. Whether Stephen Douglas
was privy to any of this plotting is more doubtful, but Lincoln's point was narrower:
Douglas's prior actions and words provided the perfect "niche" for insertion of the
Dred Scott decision; his present stance was unrestrained support of the decision; and
the position further committed Douglas to accepting a future decision of the Court
extending Dred Scott to require acceptance of slavery in Northern states. See infra
notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
85 See Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech, supra note 44, at 432.
86 Id.
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These are strong words-a direct and rather pointed challenge to
judicial authority. Lincoln did not, directly, call for the "overthrow" of
the Supreme Court's power. But he did, by clear implication, identify
the Court's actions and power as part of a concerted plan to national-
ize slavery. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Lincoln viewed the
Supreme Court as part of the "present political dynasty" that needed
to be "met and overthrown." In a sense, Douglas was right: Lincoln's
position was a thinly veiled assault on the authority of the Supreme
Court. Its decision in Dred Scott was to be met and overthrown, lest it
be accepted and extended.
At Chicago on July 10, still before Douglas had agreed to the
series of seven formal debates, Lincoln elaborated the difference
between his and Douglas's positions on Dred Scott.8 7 Lincoln did not
"resist" the decision in the literal sense of proposing "to take Dred
Scott from his master. 88 But he did resist it "as a political rule." 9
Thus, Lincoln proclaimed that if he were in Congress, "and a vote
should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited
in a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I would vote
that it should."90
This was Andrew Jackson's position put into action: the decision
of the Court on constitutional questions could not constrain the
action of a coordinate department. Moreover, in Lincoln's hands, the
Jackson position became a sword as well as a shield. Jackson had said
that the Court's decision upholding some action as constitutional did
not bar political branches from declining to take such action on the
basis of a different judgment that such action would be unconstitu-
87 See Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, supra note 76, at 450-55.
88 Id. at 450.
89 Id. Lincoln was continuing to adhere to the distinction between a decision as
controlling the specific case as opposed to determining a general rule. As I have set
forth elsewhere (and will reprise below), this plausible cutoff point to Lincoln's logic
collapses when one leans on it hard. See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6,
at 103-06; infra note 277 and accompanying text. If the wrongness-the unconstitu-
tionality--of a judicial decision, combined with the coequal status of coordinate
branches, permits (and perhaps requires) the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment to refuse to abide by such decision as a prospective, general rule, in the
exercise of their legislative and executive powers, it is hard to see why that same rea-
soning should not apply in the particular case decided. If a President, confronted
with an anticonstitutional judicial decision ordering a free man into slavery, is called
upon to use his independent executive power to enforce it, why should the judiciary's
decision control his different constitutional understanding, within the sphere of his
separate, independent powers? For an extended defense of this position, see Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6, at 272-84.
90 Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, supra note 76, at 450-51.
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tional. Lincoln's corollary, as applied to the Court's decision in Dred
Scott, was that the Court's decision invalidating legislative action as
unconstitutional did not control the legislature's subsequent judgment
that enacting such legislation was constitutional-a crucial additional
step, though certainly a logical one.91
Lincoln did not directly address whether political officials could
enforce such legislation if the Supreme Court were to hold it uncon-
stitutional-certainly a predictable outcome, given Dred Scott. Rather,
he merely stated that "we mean to do what we can to have the court
decide the other way. That is one thing we mean to try to do."92 Lin-
coln contrasted this view with Douglas's position that "all hands must
take this extraordinary decision, made under these extraordinary cir-
cumstances, and give their vote in Congress in accordance with it,
yield to it and obey it in every possible sense."9 3 Lincoln denied this,
again using Douglas's-and Jackson's-continued resistance to the
constitutionality of a national bank as his example.9 4 Again, the argu-
ment was not (yet) for congressional or executive action in defiance
of a specific judgment of the Court; it was for the propriety of political
action notwithstanding a conflicting Supreme Court precedent, cou-
pled with the intention to seek to have that precedent overturned. 95
In a July 17 speech back in Springfield, Lincoln, still shadowing
Douglas, said much the same thing as he had at Chicago.9 6 He would
not interfere with the rights of property established in a specific deci-
sion as to Dred Scott and his family, but he rejected Douglas's position
that would "have the citizen conform his vote to that decision; the
Member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power."9 7
The allusion to Jackson's bank bill veto is clear, and Lincoln made it
explicit a few minutes later. Lincoln told his audience that he had
"reminded [Douglas] of a Supreme Court decision which he opposed
for at least several years" 9 8-meaning McCulloch, the decision which
91 Stephen Douglas would eventually point out the fact that Lincoln's position
was a step beyond Jackson's, and distinguishable. See infra notes 154-58 and accom-
panying text. To peek ahead in the story: as President, Lincoln put his views into
action, signing into law legislation passed by Congress banning slavery in the territo-
ries and in the District of Columbia. Congress debated the constitutional issues to
some extent, but the direct conflict between such legislation and the Dred Scott deci-
sion was not among the major points of discussion. See infra Part IV.C.
92 Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, supra note 76, at 451.
93 See id. at 452.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 450-52.
96 See Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, supra note 74, at 472-76.
97 Id. at 473.
98 Id.
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Jackson had refused to regard as binding his constitutional judgment
as President.99
Lincoln then conscripted a new iconic authority to accompany
Jackson on "this question of judicial authority"'° 00-the immortal
Thomas Jefferson. "I wish to show that I am sustained by authority, in
addition to that heretofore presented," Lincoln said, and begged the
indulgence of his audience to read Jefferson's 1820 letter to William
CharlesJarvis thanking him for a book, but challenging the author on
a critical point.101 Here is Lincoln, reading Jefferson's letter tojarvis:
I feel an urgency to note what I deem an error in it, the more
requiring notice as your opinion is strengthened by that of many
others. You seem in pages 84 and 148, to consider the judges as the
ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions-a very dangerous
doctrine indeed and one which would place us under the despotism
of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men, and not
more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for
power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is, "boni
judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem"; and their power is the more
dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the
other functionaries are, to the elective control. The Constitution
has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands
confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would
become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-
equal and co-sovereign within themselves.
10 2
Lincoln then twisted the knife: "Thus we see the power claimed for
the Supreme Court by Judge Douglas, Mr. Jefferson holds, would
reduce us to the despotism of an oligarchy." 10 3 Lincoln placed his
own views within what we today would call Jefferson's "departmental-
ist" position: "I have said no more than this-in fact, never quite so
much as this-at least I am sustained by Mr. Jefferson." 10 4
Lincoln's embrace of Jefferson is significant. Jefferson's letter to
Jarvis was no aberration; Jefferson had said many such things before,
99 See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
100 Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, supra note 74, at 473.
101 See id.
102 Id. at 473-74 (quotingJefferson's letter toJarvis). Translated, the Latin phrase
means "it is the duty of a good judge to expand his jurisdiction." Craig S. Lerner,
Impeachment, Attainder, and a True Constitutional Crisis: Lessons from the Stafford Trial, 69
U. CHI. L. REv. 2057, 2079 n.75 (2002) (book review). ForJefferson's letter in Jeffer-
son's papers, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28,
1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1816-1826, at 160, 160-61 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., N.Y., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1899).
103 Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, supra note 74, at 474.
104 Id.
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and as President had acted on his views. 10 5 Perhaps no early President
was more firmly opposed to the idea ofjudicial supremacy, more com-
mitted to the right and power of the other branches of government to
interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, and more pre-
pared to exercise such prerogative, than Jefferson. 0 6 For Lincoln to
view his position as "sustained by Mr. Jefferson" is for Lincoln to stand
against the binding authority of Supreme Court decisions on the Pres-
ident. Lincoln was not quite there yet in 1858-thus his remark that
he had said "never quite so much as this"-but he was well on his way
to where he would end up less than three years later as President.
In the next few weeks of the summer, Douglas finally acceded to a
series of seven formal debates with Lincoln, which would begin on
August 21, 1858, and continue into the fall. Lincoln's notes for a draft
speech show his preparation for the debates of the same points dis-
cussed above-his refusal to accept Dred Scott "as a political rule,"'
0 7
the positions of Jefferson and Jackson "against [Douglas] on the bind-
ing political authority of Supreme Court decisions,"' 018 and the incon-
sistency of Douglas's own past conduct with his newfound insistence
on judicial supremacy. Lincoln also developed a refined point, link-
ing his "House Divided" charge of a slavery-nationalizing conspiracy
(including Douglas) with his attack on judicial supremacy.10 9 The
object of nationalizing slavery, Lincoln wrote,
can be done by a Supreme Court decision holding that the United
States Constitution forbids a State to exclude slavery; and probably
it can be done in no other way.... To such a decision, when it comes,
Judge Douglas is fully committed. Such a decision acquiesced in by the peo-
ple effects the whole object. 10
And Douglas, with his stance on the authority of Dred Scott, was prepar-
ing the public to accept precisely such a decision. 1 '
105 See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6, at 255-57 (collecting sev-
eral of Jefferson's statements-from before, during, and after his presidency-
defending the independence of the several branches of the federal government in
constitutional interpretation and criticizing the notion of judicial supremacy).
106 See id. at 255 ("Perhaps the most direct, forthright advocate of independent
executive branch interpretative power during the founding era was Thomas
Jefferson.").
107 Abraham Lincoln, Draft of a Speech (Aug. 1858), in LINCOLN 1832-1858,
supra note 8, at 487, 492.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 490-93.
110 Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added).
1II Specifically, Lincoln wrote:
In this age, and this country, public sentiment is every thing. With it, noth-
ing can fail; against it, nothing can succeed. Whoever moulds public senti-
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This would become a standard part of Lincoln's debate reper-
toire. In the first debate, at Ottawa, Douglas's opening speech
charged Lincoln with "warfare on the Supreme Court of the United
States and its decision [in Dred Scott]. '"112 Lincoln's reply developed
the point he had prepared in advance:
Then what is necessary for the nationalization of slavery? It is simply
the next Dred Scott decision. It is merely for the Supreme Court to
decide that no State under the Constitution can exclude it, just as
they have already decided that under the Constitution neither Con-
gress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it. When that is decided
and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done.
113
Douglas, Lincoln charged, was exerting his influence on public
sentiment, preparing it to accept such a second Dred Scott decision.
Such influence was important: "In this and like communities, public
sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; with-
out it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who moulds public sen-
timent, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces
decisions."1 14 And Douglas was preparing the public to acquiesce to
the nationalization of slavery by the trick of arguing for public accept-
ance of the Supreme Court's decisions, no matter how wrong they
might be.
This man sticks to a decision which forbids the people of a Territory
from excluding slavery, and he does so not because he says it is right
in itself-he does not give any opinion on that-but because it has
been decided by the court, and being decided by the court, he is, and
ment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes, or pronounces judicial
decisions. He makes possible the inforcement of these, else impossible.
Judge Douglas is a man of large influence.
Id. at 493. As we shall see, Lincoln employed nearly identical language in his debates
with Douglas. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
112 First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 76, at 504 (speech of Mr. Douglas).
Douglas's point of attack was Lincoln's disagreement with the Court's holding that
blacks could not be citizens, which Douglas twisted into an untrue assertion that Lin-
coln favored universal black citizenship. The Little Giant was a giant racist dema-
gogue. Throughout the debates, Douglas-seizing on Lincoln's less restrained
statements about the equality of all men under the Declaration of Independence-
sought to push Lincoln into the radical-abolitionist comer. It was Lincoln's resistance
to this characterization that provoked him into several regrettable racist remarks of
his own, made in the course of distinguishing the equal rights of all to freedom from
any assertion of complete racial, social, and political equality. SeeJAMES OAKEs, THE
RADICAL AND THE REPUBLICAN 119-31 (2007) (discussing, and not excusing, Lincoln's
racist statements in the debates with Douglas); supra note 76 (collecting some of Lin-
coln's embarrassingly racist statements).
113 First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 76, at 524 (reply of Mr. Lincoln).
114 Id. at 524-25.
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you are bound to take it in your political action as law--not that he
judges at all of its merits, but because a decision of the court is to
him a "Thus saith the Lord." [Applause.] He places it on that
ground alone, and you will bear in mind that thus committing him-
self unreservedly to this decision, commits him to the next onejust as
firmly as to this. He did not commit himself on account of the
merit or demerit of the decision, but it is a Thus saith the Lord. The
next decision, as much as this, will be a ths saith the Lord.' l5
Lincoln then invoked again Jackson and Jefferson-and Doug-
las's own actions as an Illinois Supreme Court judge-against any
absolutely binding quality to judicial decisions. 1 6 "But I cannot shake
Judge Douglas's teeth loose from the Dred Scott decision," Lincoln
perorated, to his audience's apparent delight:
Like some obstinate animal (I mean no disrespect,) that will hang
on when he has once got his teeth fixed, you may cut off a leg, or
you may tear away an arm, still he will not relax his hold .... He
hangs to the last, to the Dred Scott decision. [Loud cheers.] These
things show there is a purpose strong as death and eternity for which
he adheres to this decision, and for which he will adhere to all other
decisions of the same Court. [Vociferous applause.]
l
11
Lincoln's final warning was that if Douglas succeeded "in bringing
public sentiment to an exact accordance with his own views" concern-
ing the authoritativeness of Supreme Court decisions and indifference
to slavery, "then it needs only the formality of the second Dred Scott
decision, which he endorses in advance, to make Slavery alike lawful
in all the States-old as well as new, North as well as South.""18
Lincoln continued to press the "second Dred Scott' variation on
the conspiracy-to-nationalize-slavery theme throughout the debates.
As noted above, some historians have doubted whether there was gen-
uinely any "conspiracy" to nationalize slavery." I 9
Moreover, it can be debated whether Dred Scott's logic truly
implied a constitutional right to transport slavery to Northern states,
as well as federal territories. The Court's opinion did not say that in
terms, and the (pretextual) textual hook for invalidating the Missouri
Compromise prohibition, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
limited federal action, not states.'
20
115 Id. at 525.
116 See id.
117 Id. at 526.
118 Id. at 527.
119 See supra note 84.
120 See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833).
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But Lincoln's points were certainly fair. He made clear that he
did not personally know of an actual conspiracy, but that he believed
there was at least a partial agreement, or tacit complicity, in measures
designed (by some) to achieve the nationalization of slavery.' 21 And
his argument that the "logic" of Dred Scott (such as it was) could very
well be used to support such a result is a strong one. The Court made
up its law in Dred Scott and could extend its made-up law, or decline to,
as it wished-especially if the public could be expected to acquiesce in
whatever the Court proclaimed. And if it really were true (as the
Court's opinion averred) that the constitutional right to slavery was
"distinctly and expressly affirmed" in the Constitution, 122 then no
Northern state's laws could impair that right any more than congres-
sional or territorial legislation could do so. 123 Finally, at least one case
pending in the state courts of New York presented the question of
whether state law could deprive a slave owner traveling through New
York of his slave property the moment he set foot on Yankee soil. 124 It
was not in the least farfetched to imagine the United States Supreme
Court concluding, on any of a number of grounds, that such a state
law violated the constitutional rights of the slave owner.1
25
121 First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 76, at 519 (reply of Mr. Lincoln) ("I
do not say that I know such a conspiracy to exist. To that, I reply I believe it.").
122 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1857).
123 See U.S. CONsT. art. NI, cl. 2. In the fifth debate, Lincoln would offer this rea-
sonably straightforward syllogism, building from the premises of the Court in Dred
Scott
Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right dis-
tinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States. [Lin-
coln invoked Article VI's Supremacy Clause in support of this proposition.]
The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution of the United States; [Lincoln quoted Dred Scott for this
proposition.]
Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy
the right of property in a slave.
Fifth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Galesburg, Illinois (Oct. 7, 1858) [hereinafter Fifth
Lincoln-Douglas Debate], in LINCOLN 1832-1858, supra note 8, at 687, 714 (reply of
Mr. Lincoln). For further discussion, see infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
124 See Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
125 Cf id. at 607-15 (opinion of Denio, J.) (rejecting arguments based upon the
Privileges and Immunities and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of Article IV and the
Commerce Clause of Article I); id. at 625-28 (opinion of Wright, J.) (same).
Although the Court's decision in Dred Scott did not formally resolve the question
presented in Lemmon, it is not hard to imagine the Dred Scott Court determining that
the right to own slaves-protected by the Constitution-was a privilege and immunity
entitled to full faith and credit as citizens migrated from Southern to Northern states.
See Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 2, at 1015 n.51.
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Accordingly, in the second debate, at Freeport, Lincoln pro-
pounded the following as one of his famous "interrogatories" for
Douglas to answer: "If the Supreme Court of the United States shall
decide that States can not exclude slavery from their limits, are you in
favor of acquiescing in, adopting and following such decision as a rule
of political action? [Loud applause.] ",126
Douglas dodged: "I am amazed that Lincoln should ask such a
question," he responded.1 27 No one would ever pretend to support
such an outrageous proposition. Lincoln's very question, said
Douglas,
casts an imputation upon the Supreme Court of the United States
by supposing that they would violate the Constitution of the United
States. I tell him that such a thing is not possible. (Cheers.) It
would be an act of moral treason that no man on the bench could
ever descend to.
128
Lincoln's rebuttal that day sought to show that the claimed con-
stitutional right was scarcely unimaginable-on the contrary, precisely
this position was asserted in the Washington Union (known to be the
house organ of the Buchanan administration), and Douglas had read
this position into the record of congressional debates as an "authorita-
tive" statement of just such views.1 29 The position Douglas had
branded treason was very much part of public debate. Lincoln
thereby implied that Douglas ought to be expected to answer; the
hypothetical was not absurd.
A law professor, of course, might expect a student to answer the
hypothetical, regardless of its plausibility, so as to arrive at the relevant
point of principle. What if the Supreme Court did commit the
unthinkable, morally treasonous act of issuing a decision violating the
Constitution of the United States? Should such a decision be
accepted as binding law? (And why is not that hypothetical precisely
the situation posed by Dred Scott?) Was Douglas's position that the
Supreme Court's decisions must be accepted no matter what outra-
geous thing the Court might say or do?
Lincoln was as skilled a cross-examiner as any law professor. His
Freeport question is a perfect logical trap for Douglas. Lincoln
thought "that the peculiar reasons put forth by Judge Douglas for
endorsing this decision, commit him in advance to the next decision,
126 Second Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 74, at 542 (speech of Mr.
Lincoln).
127 Id. at 553 (speech of Mr. Douglas).
128 Id. at 554.
129 See id. at 577-80 (rejoinder of Mr. Lincoln).
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and to all other decisions emanating from the same source" and that
the reasoning of Dred Scott could prove "equally applicable to the Free
States as to the Free Territories. ' 13 0 If judicial supremacy is the rule,
and unthinking acceptance of Supreme Court decisions required,
then the Supreme Court very well could make slavery national.
Douglas continued to embrace judicial supremacy while evading
answering whether this principle would include a second Dred Scott
decision. In the third debate, at Jonesboro, Douglas gave the follow-
ing explanation of his position, in terms that sound remarkably like
modern academic and judicial arguments for judicial supremacy:
[Lincoln] makes war on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case known as the Dred Scott case. I wish to say to you, fellow-citi-
zens, that I have no war to make on that decision, or any other ever
rendered by the Supreme Court. I am content to take that decision as it
stands delivered by the highest judicial tribunal on earth, a tribunal estab-
lished by the Constitution of the United States for that purpose, and hence
that decision becomes the law of the land, binding on you, on me, and on
every other good citizen, whether we like it or not. Hence I do not choose
to go into an argument to prove, before this audience, whether or
not Chief Justice Taney understood the law better than Abraham
Lincoln. (Laughter.) 131
130 Abraham Lincoln, Portion of Speech at Edwardsville, Illinois (Sept. 11, 1858),
in LINCOLN 1832-1858, supra note 8, at 580, 584.
131 Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 8, at 597-98 (emphasis added)
(speech of Mr. Douglas); see also id. at 600 ("Judge Taney expressly lays down the
doctrine. I receive it as law .... ."). For modern echoes, see Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867-68 (1992) (speaking of the Court's authority to
.speak before all others" as to the meaning of the Constitution and the expectation
that citizens' loyalty to the Constitution is "tested by following" the Court's decisions,
notwithstanding disagreement); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (-1958) (equating the
Supreme Court's decisions with the Constitution itself as "supreme law of the land,"
binding on all). The Supreme Court's modern assertions ofjudicial supremacy, since
Cooper first took such a stance, are now commonplace. See Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions
interpreting and applying the Constitution."); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 617 n.7 (2000) ("'I[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution.'" (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922-23 (1995)));
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (indicating that "'[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,'" over and
above the interpretations of the executive branch (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (describ-
ing the Court as the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution").
For academic arguments echoing Douglas at Jonesboro, see Larry Alexander &
Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV.
1359, 1377 (1997) (emphasizing the need for judicial supremacy in order to establish
authoritative finality in law's dispute-resolution function); Daniel A. Farber, Judicial
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Douglas's argument, stripped of its rhetoric, is, first, that the
Supreme Court is the "tribunal established" by the Constitution for
purposes of deciding the proper interpretation of the document-a
textual and structural argument (albeit not an especially strong
one);132 and second, an implicit argument of superior judicial compe-
tence, framed as an ad hominem dig at Lincoln, the Illinois country-
bumpkin lawyer in contrast to the learned ChiefJustice. 133 Both argu-
ments find their echoes in modern defenses ofjudicial supremacy.
134
What the Lincoln-Douglas debate over Dred Scott demonstrates so
powerfully, however, is that the Supreme Court's decisions can violate
the Constitution, exposing the weak intuitive textual claim of judicial
supremacy as almost absurdly contrary to every principle of separation
of powers and limited, constitutional government bounded by the text
of the Constitution. Douglas's laugh line that it is hardly necessary to
prove that the Supreme Court understood the law better than poor
Abraham Lincoln is also given the lie both by Lincoln's cogent argu-
ments and by the better judgment of history.
Lincoln, somewhat disappointingly, did not pick up on this
thread of the argument in the third debate, atJonesboro, choosing to
emphasize other points. This gave Douglas a chance to elaborate on
his judicial supremacist position in his rejoinder. Douglas framed his
point in the form of questions directed at Lincoln, knowing that
under the debate arrangements to which the two men had agreed,
Lincoln would not have a chance to speak again until the next debate.
Review and Its Alternatives: An American Tale, 38 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 415, 429-30
(2003) (emphasizing the need for some authoritative decisionmaker and pointing to
Article III of the Constitution as strongly suggesting that the Supreme Court is the
tribunal established by the Constitution for this purpose).
132 See generally Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6 (addressing at
length the textual, structural, historical, and precedential arguments asserted for judi-
cial supremacy).
133 See Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 8, at 598 (speech of Mr.
Douglas).
134 See supra note 131. On supposedly superior judicial competence, see Christo-
pher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO.
L.J. 347 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A
Reply to Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 389-93 (1994) (critiquing
the "comparative competence" suggestion); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905, 916 (1990) (criticizing the notion that the judici-
ary consists of more competent constitutional interpreters). For a particularly amus-
ing, and uncommonly insightful, criticism of the "superior competence" argument,
see Gary Lawson, Interpretive Equality as a Structural Imperative (or "Pucker Up and Settle
This!"), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 381 n.10, 383-84 (2003) ("The best candidate for
supreme interpreter is, obviously, me. The second best candidate is probably Mike
Paulsen . ").
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Again, Douglas's position merits quotation at length, for it closely
tracks modern arguments for judicial supremacy:
I want to know whether [Lincoln] is not bound to a decision which
is contrary to his opinions just as much as to one in accordance with
his opinions. (Certainly.) If the decision of the Supreme Court, the
tribunal created by the constitution to decide the question, is final
and binding, is he not bound by it just as strongly as if he was for it
instead of against it originally. Is every man in this land allowed to
resist decisions he does not like, and only support those that meet
his approval? What are important courts worth unless their deci-
sions are binding on all good citizens? It is the fundamental pinci-
ples of the judiciary that its decisions are final. It is created for that
purpose so that when you cannot agree among yourselves on a dis-
puted point you appeal to the judicial tribunal which steps in and
decides for you, and that decision is then binding on every good
citizen. It is the law of the land just as much with Mr. Lincoln
against it as for it. . . . I am willing to take the decision of the
Supreme Court as it was pronounced by that august tribunal with-
out stopping to inquire whether I would have decided that way or
not. I have had many a decision made against me on questions of
law which I did not like, but I was bound by them just as much as if I
had had a hand in making them, and approved them.
1 35
135 Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 8, at 633-34 (rejoinder of Mr.
Douglas). Douglas scored a good debater's turnaround on Lincoln on this point.
Much of Lincoln's speech had been directed at urging that Douglas's commitment to
Dred Scott logically required him, by virtue of his oath, not only to deny the validity of
local territorial legislation interfering with slavery but also to support federal legisla-
tion effectuating the constitutional ight to slavery in the territories. See id. at 619-20
(reply of Mr. Lincoln) ("What do you understand by supporting the Constitution of a
State or of the United States? Is it not to give such constitutional helps to the rights
established by that Constitution as may be practically needed? Can you, if you swear
to support the Constitution, and believe that the Constitution establishes a right, clear
your oath, without giving it support?... How could you, having sworn to support the
Constitution, and believing it guaranteed the right to hold slaves in the Territories,
assist in legislation intended to defeat that right? That would be violating your own view
of the constitution.... Lastly I would ask-is not Congress, itself, under obligation to
give legislative support to any right that is established under the United States Consti-
tution? ... A member of Congress swears to support the Constitution of the United
States, and if he sees a right established by that Constitution which needs specific
legislative protection, can he clear his oath without giving that protection?").
Yet Lincoln's artfully drawn line with respect to the authority of Dred Scott-that it
was law for the case (but not law for the land) and that a "mob" could not by force
rightfully overturn the Court's judgment with respect to Scott's slave status-ran into
somewhat the same difficulty. Said Douglas:
Well if you (turning to Mr. Lincoln) are not going to resist the decision, if
you obey it, and do not intend to array mob law against the constituted
[VOL. 83:31258
LINCOLN AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
In this passage, Douglas made unambiguously explicit the claim
of judicial supremacy: "It is the fundamental principles of the judici-
ary that its decisions are final."'13 6 To the arguments made in his
opening speech-the suggestion that the Constitution's text and
structure anoint the judiciary as the final interpreter; the assertion of
superior interpretive competence on the part of the courts; and the
necessity of unquestioned finality in order to serve the function of
resolving disputes-Douglas added two related hobgoblins: first, the
specter of chaos if decisions are not final; 137 and second, the fear that
anything other than unthinking acceptance of the Court's decisions
would render the judiciary useless.
138
Considered as a whole, these arguments are not bad, but there
are ready responses to them. The idea that judicial decisions might
legitimately be resisted by the political branches is not an invitation to
"chaos."'139 Rather, it can be seen as a logical, even desirable, conse-
quence of the separation of powers and attendant checks and bal-
ances, applied to the shared incidental power of constitutional
interpretation. 14 0 Nor does this make the judiciary a useless branch;
quite the contrary, it only means that the judiciary is not ultimately an
all-powerful branch.' 41 It means that judicial decisions are check-
authorities, then, according to your own statement, you will be a perjured
man if you do not vote to establish slavery in these territories.
Id. at 633 (rejoinder of Mr. Douglas). As I discuss in Part IV, Lincoln's position that
the Court's judgment in the specific case must be obeyed and enforced, but that its
constitutional interpretation need not be followed by political actors in their subse-
quent actions in other individual cases, tends to collapse in practice (and did for
Lincoln, upon becoming President). See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6,
at 98-99; infra Part IV.
136 Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 8, at 633 (rejoinder of Mr.
Douglas).
137 See id. ("Is every man in this land allowed to resist decisions he does not like,
and only support those that meet his approval?").
138 See id. ("What are important courts worth unless their decisions are binding on
all good citizens?"). Again, modern echoes of Douglas are plentiful. On "chaos," see
Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 918 ("Tension and enduring disagreement are not
chaos."); Paulsen, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 6, at 2738-39 (distinguishing chaos
from "a decentralized approach to constitutional interpretation"). For an argument
that if the judiciary's decisions are not binding on all other political actors the judici-
ary is a useless cipher, see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43, 71 (1993). For a response, see
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6, at 300-03.
139 See Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 918; Paulsen, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 6,
at 2738-39.
140 See Paulsen, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 6, at 2738-39; Paulsen, The Most Dan-
gerous Branch, supra note 6, at 321-31.
141 See supra note 138.
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able-a vision far more consonant with separation of powers and con-
stitutional supremacy than is the idea of complete judicial supremacy
over the Constitution. It is also consistent with the Framers' observa-
tion that the judiciary's powers would in fact be the "least dangerous"
of any branchI 42-observations that make no sense at all under a view
of complete judicial supremacy.
Lincoln's refutation of Douglas's contention was an inspired rhe-
torical variation on this theme: he sought to illustrate the absurdity of
a requirement of absolute acceptance of judicial decisions no matter
what by demonstrating the logical consequence of such a stance. And
so he returned, finally, in the fifth debate, at Galesburg, to his third
interrogatory at Freeport: "'If the Supreme Court of the United States
shall decide that the States cannot exclude slavery from their limits,
are you in favor of acquiescing in, adhering to and following such
decision, as a rule of political action?"'1 43 Lincoln noted that Doug-
las's only response, in three debates, had been to "sneer" at the ques-
tion.' 44 It was here, in the fifth debate, that Lincoln set forth his
famous syllogism in support of the plausibility of the Supreme Court
reaching precisely such a conclusion. 145 Major premise (from the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution): "Nothing in the Constitution
or laws of any State can destroy a right distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution of the United States." 146 Minor premise
(from the Court's decision in Dred Scott): "The right of property in a
slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the
United States."'147 Conclusion: "Therefore, nothing in the Constitu-
tion or laws of any State can destroy the right of property in a
slave." 14
8
Lincoln then confronted Douglas's judicial supremacy argument
directly and denied it emphatically. Charging Douglas with "prepar-
ing the public mind for that new Dred Scott decision," Lincoln
repeated his demand of Douglas for "the reasons for his firm adher-
142 See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6, at 219.
143 Fifth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 123, at 713 (reply of Mr. Lincoln)
(quoting Second Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 74, at 542 (speech of Mr.
Lincoln)).
144 See id.; Second Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 74, at 553-54 (reply of Mr.
Douglas); supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
145 See Fifth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 123, at 714-15 (reply of Mr. Lin-
coln); see also supra note 123.
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ence to the Dred Scott decision as it is."149 Drawing on what had by
this time become stock arguments, Lincoln continued:
I have turned his attention to the fact that General Jackson differed
with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court
decision. I have asked his attention to the fact Jefferson differed
with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court
decision. Jefferson said, that 'Judges are as honest as other men,
and not more so." And he said, substantially, that "whenever a free
people should give up in absolute submission to any department of
government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their liber-
ties were gone." . . .
So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge
Douglas upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except
that he swells himself up and says, "All of us who stand by the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court are the friends of the Constitution; all
you fellows that dare question it in any way, are the enemies of the
Constitution." [Continued laughter and cheers.] .. . And the man-
ner in which he adheres to it-not as being right upon the merits,
as he conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being
absolutely obligatory upon every one simply because of the source
from whence it comes-as that which no man can gainsay, whatever
it may be,-this is another marked feature of his adherence to that
decision. It marks it in this respect, that it commits him to the next
decision, whenever it comes, as being as obligatory as this one, since
he does not investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is
right or wrong. So he takes the next one without inquiring whether
it is right or wrong. [Applause.] He teaches men this doctrine, and
in so doing prepares the public mind to take the next decision
when it comes, without any inquiry. In this I think I argue fairly...
that Judge Douglas is most ingeniously and powerfully preparing
the public mind to take that decision when it comes .... 150
Lincoln thus mocked the idea that the Supreme Court necessarily
spoke, correctly, for the Constitution. With Jefferson, he regarded the
idea of "absolute submission" to the Court as giving up the people's
liberties-a theme he would develop, deliberately but carefully, in his
First Inaugural. 1 5 1 And Lincoln pointed directly to what he feared
would be given up almost immediately: the right of Northern states to
exclude slavery from their soil. Lincoln, unquestionably, stood
opposed to "this doctrine" of judicial supremacy, which Douglas was
149 Id. at 715.
150 Id. at 715-17. Lincoln's paraphrase ofJefferson appears to derive from Jeffer-
son's letter to William Charles Jarvis, which Lincoln had read aloud in his speech at
Springfield, before the formal debates. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
151 See infra Part IV.A.
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using to prepare the public to accept the judicial nationalization of
slavery.
Douglas's rejoinder at Galesburg again denied the validity of the
hypothetical, again accused Lincoln of attempting "to bring the
Supreme Court into disrepute among the people,"115 2 and argued that
Lincoln's position would take an "appeal from the Supreme Court of
the United States to every town meeting in the hope that he can excite
a prejudice against that court, and on the wave of that prejudice ride
into the Senate of the United States, when he could not get there on
his own principles, or his own merits."'153
Douglas then offered a sound distinction between Jackson's veto
of the bank bill (notwithstanding McCulloch) and Lincoln's refusal to
be bound by Dred Scott.154 Jackson did not refuse to enforce a judicial
decision; he simply declined to agree to the bank's reauthorization,
based on his different assessment of the constitutional propriety of
using a means he thought not truly "necessary and proper." 155 Jack-
son thus used his different constitutional assessment as a shield, not as
a sword. "Is Congress bound to pass every act that is constitutional?"
Douglas asked.15 6 Lincoln's defiance was different: "And because
General Jackson would not do a thing which he had a right to do, but
did not deem expedient or proper, Mr. Lincoln is going to justify him-
self in doing that which he has no right to do. (Laughter.)" 57 Doug-
las then reiterated his arguments that the Supreme Court was
empowered to decide "all constitutional questions in the last resort,
and when such decisions have been made, they become the law of the
land, . . . and you, and he, and myself, and every other good citizen
are bound by them." 158
By the last two debates, the argument over the authoritativeness
of the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott, and the authoritative-
ness of a hypothetical second Dred Scott case, was familiar and thor-
oughly played out. At Quincy, Lincoln repeated his stance that he
opposed Dred Scott as a rule of political action, but that it would be
152 Fifth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 123, at 727 (rejoinder of Mr.
Douglas).
153 Id. at 728.
154 See id. at 728-29.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 728.
157 See id. at 728-29.
158 Id. at 729; see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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improper to interfere with the execution of the judgment itself.159 He
also repeated his charge of Douglas's inconsistency on this point,
given his own prior stance against the Bank and his own appointment
to the Illinois Supreme Court to reverse an earlier decision. 60
Douglas likewise repeated his position that the Supreme Court's
decisions were final and binding on everyone, whether one agreed
with them or not. "The Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the
highest tribunal on earth," Douglas put it.161 "From that decision
there is no appeal this side of Heaven .... It is not for me to inquire
after a decision is made whether I like it in all the points or not."'162
Rather, it was "the duty of every law-abiding man" to "take the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court as the law of the land" and "to obey them
as such."'1 63 Douglas then added, rather dramatically, that anything
less than complete, unquestioning acceptance of the Supreme Court's
decisions was an attempt to stir up "rebellion in the country against
the constituted authorities" and to instigate "resort to violence and to
mobs instead of to the law."' 164 And as to Lincoln's charge that this
committed Douglas to accepting a second Dred Scott decision, Douglas
held to his response that it was inconceivable that the Supreme Court
could "degrade itself so low as to make a decision known to be in
direct violation of the constitution." 165
159 See Sixth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1&58) [hereinafter
Sixth Lincoln-Douglas Debate], in LINCOLN 1832-1858, supra note 8, at 730, 741
(speech of Mr. Lincoln).
160 See id. at 767-68 (rejoinder of Mr. Lincoln). Lincoln argued that Douglas's
appointment to the Illinois Supreme Court had resulted from a concerted political
effort to have a particular decision of that court overruled. See id.
161 Id. at 754 (reply of Mr. Douglas).
162 Id. at 754-55.
163 Id. at 755.
164 Id.
165 Id. This provoked a comment from a member of the crowd: "A VOICE.-The
same thing was said about the Dred Scott decision before it passed." Id. Touch6! See
supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting that the prospect of a second Dred Scott
decision was hardly unimaginable). Douglas repeated the heckler's charge, and
began to answer in the form of defending the correctness of the Dred Scott decision
and its consistency with earlier decisions, see Sixth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note
159, at 755-56 (reply of Mr. Douglas) ("[T]he Dred Scott decision on that point
[Negro citizenship] only affirmed what every court in the land knew to be the law"),
before he caught himself: "But, I will not be drawn off into an argument upon the
merits of the Dred Scott decision," id. at 756. He then returned to his standard of
unquestioning acceptance of Supreme Court decisions without acknowledging that
such a view did in principle commit him to acceptance even of decisions he might
regard as ridiculous or "in direct violation of the constitution." Id. at 755; see also id.
at 756 ("It is enough for me to know that the Constitution of the United States cre-
ated the Supreme Court for the purpose of deciding all disputed questions touching
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The seventh and final debate, at Alton on October 15, 1858, was
one of the best, for its discussions of slavery, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, Douglas's conflict with the Buchanan administration, and
the specifics of Lincoln's precise position on all these points. The
binding force of Supreme Court decisions received only glancing
mention by Lincoln, but it is an intriguing glance. Building on Doug-
las's awkward, disingenuous, "Freeport doctrine" insistence that terri-
tories remained free to pass legislation unfriendly to slavery; 166 and
adding to his own argument at Jonesboro that if Douglas accepted
Dred Scott, it was then a violation of his constitutional oath of office to
refuse to support legislation protecting the right of slavery in the terri-
tories, Lincoln clinched the point at Alton in a way that clearly repudi-
ates any binding, prospective force to Supreme Court decisions on
disputed constitutional questions:
I do not believe it is a constitutional right to hold slaves in a Terri-
tory of the United States. I believe the decision was improperly
made and I go for reversing it. Judge Douglas is furious against
those who go for reversing a decision. But he is for legislating it out
of all force while the law itself stands. I repeat that there has never
been so monstrous a doctrine uttered from the mouth of a respecta-
ble man. [Loud cheers.]
... And if I believed that the right to hold a slave in a Territory
was equally fixed in the Constitution with the right to reclaim fugi-
tives, I should be bound to give it the legislation necessary to sup-
port it. I say that no man can deny his obligation to give the
necessary legislation to support slavery in a Territory, who believes it
is a constitutional right to have it there .... I defy anybody to go
before a body of men whose minds are educated to estimating evi-
dence and reasoning, and show that there is an iota of difference
between the constitutional right to reclaim a fugitive, and the con-
stitutional right to hold a slave, in a Territory, provided this Dred
Scott decision is correct. [Cheers.] I defy any man to make an
argument that will justify unfriendly legislation to deprive a slave-
holder of his right to hold his slave in a Territory, that will not
equally, in all its length, breadth and thickness furnish an argument
for nullifying the fugitive slave law. Why there is not such an Aboli-
tionist in the nation as Douglas, after all. [Loud and enthusiastic
applause.] 167
the true construction of that instrument, and when such decisions are pronounced,
they are the law of the land, binding on every good citizen.").
166 See supra note 74.
167 Seventh Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 75, at 812-15 (reply of Mr.
Lincoln).
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Douglas was in a pickle. He could save his cherished "popular sover-
eignty" only by chiseling on Dred Scott, and he could only truly
embrace judicial supremacy if he gave up popular sovereignty. His
mugwump position was the worst of both worlds. As Lincoln skillfully
pointed out, if Dred Scott was binding, it legally entitled slave owners to
their constitutional rights to slavery in the territories and Douglas's
Freeport doctrine, tolerating unfriendly territorial legislation, was
utterly unprincipled. (It was unprincipled; Southerners could see it
too, and this fact contributed to Douglas's undoing in the Democratic
presidential contest of 1860.)168 Douglas, trapped, ended the debates
on a low note. Avoiding any response on Dred Scott, Douglas resorted
to terrible ad hominem slanders against Lincoln, accusing Lincoln-
because of his criticism of the Mexican War while a congressman-of
"tak[ing] sides with the common enemy against his own country in
time of war.' 69 The smears were all the worse because, Douglas
speaking last, Lincoln did not have the opportunity to address them in
the debate.
Lincoln was not similarly in a Dred Scott dilemma, because he denied
that Supreme Court decisions authoritatively determine the law of the Constitu-
tion. One can see, through the course of the Lincoln-Douglas debates,
a steady sharpening and hardening of Lincoln's position against the
authority of Supreme Court decisions. The tone and tenor of Lin-
coln's opposition intensified by the end of Lincoln's unsuccessful (at
least in its immediate objective) 1858 United States Senate cam-
paign. 170 What began in 1857 as a position that judicial decisions are
final as to the parties, but only politically final once fully settled by a
course of decisions became, by steps, a charge of a sinister judicial
conspiracy, a denial of any authority of the Court to bind political
actors by erroneous decisions, and a call to "overthrow" the political
dynasty of which the Court was a part through electoral repudiation of
its decisions. 171 He enlisted Jackson in his cause, and pushed him a
step further.1 72 He then enlisted Jefferson as well, increasingly adopt-
ing the stronger Jeffersonian ground that not merely denied judicial
168 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
169 Seventh Lincoln-Douglas Debate, supra note 75, at 816 (reply of Mr. Douglas).
Douglas also falsely accused Lincoln of selling out Henry Clay in Whig presidential
politics of 1849. See id. at 817.
170 See DONALD, supra note 23, at 227-29 (recounting the results of the 1858 elec-
tion). Historians appear agreed that Lincoln probably won the popular vote and, but
for the malapportionment of the Illinois legislature, would have been elected to the
Senate. See AKIIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 410-11 (2005).
171 See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
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supremacy until Court rulings became accepted but that denied judi-
cial supremacy over the political branches, period.173 By the end of
the debates, Lincoln had developed the logical argument that if a
judicial decision was right, it was constitutionally obligatory for politi-
cal officials to support its general enforcement-a position somewhat
in tension with his earlier line that judicial decisions are binding in
the particular case decided but not of controlling prospective force.
Perhaps Lincoln, driven by the logic of his own indictment (or by
his rhetorical blows against Douglas), was gradually beginning to see
the analytic problem with the concession that a wrong decision could
bind executive officers and the public to its current enforcement in the
specific case, if it could not bind executive and legislative officers as to
its prospective enforcement in like cases. At any rate, the line Lincoln
drew in 1857 and early 1858 became the line he erased in 1861.
III. 1860: CANDIDATE AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LINCOLN AND
THE IRE OF THE SOUTH
The story of Lincoln's rise to the presidency is a familiar one.
The debates with Douglas propelled Lincoln to national notice in
Republican circles. He became Illinois's favorite-son candidate for
the presidential nomination, and won at the convention in Chicago
over better known antislavery politicians William H. Seward (of New
York) and Salmon P. Chase (of Ohio), who were perceived to be more
radical in their antislavery politics.
1 74
Lincoln's anti-judicial supremacy, anti-Dred Scott stance, so thor-
oughly explicated in the 1858 Senate campaign, was well known. The
debates with Douglas had been distributed nationally in newspaper,
pamphlet, and book form. 175 In part for this reason, and in part
because it was more the custom for men to "stand" for the presidency
rather than campaign overtly,176 there is little new material from Lin-
coln during the election campaign of 1860. What there is confirms
the anti-judicial supremacy position he stated throughout the debates
with Douglas.
If anything was new, it was the emerging Southern consensus that
a stance like Lincoln's, disputing the binding authority of Dred Scott,
was a violation of the Constitution and of Southern constitutional
rights-a grave breach of the constitutional compact, justifying the
173 See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
174 For excellent renderings of the familiar story, see DoRis KEARNS GOODWIN,
TEAM OF RIVALS 200-56 (2005); MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 179-89, 213-33.
175 See HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN AT COOPER UNION 44-45 (2004).
176 See id.
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conclusion that the bargain was at an end. This was the Douglas posi-
tion put into action. The violation of the right demanded a remedy,
and the remedy for so grave a violation was secession from a pledged
anticonstitutional administration.
The most prominent "campaign" speech by Lincoln during this
period, his notable address at Cooper Union in New York City in Feb-
ruary 1860, responded to this already nascent, developing line of
attack from Southerners. In language presaging his First Inaugural,
Lincoln addressed "a few words to the Southern people" on this point
(and others):
But you will break up the Union rather than submit to a denial
of your Constitutional rights.
That has a somewhat reckless sound; but it would be palliated,
if not fully justified, were we proposing, by the mere force of num-
bers, to deprive you of some right, plainly written down in the Con-
stitution. But we are proposing no such thing.
When you make these declarations, you have a specific and
well-understood allusion to an assumed Constitutional right of
yours, to take slaves into the federal territories, and to hold them
there as property. But no such right is specifically written in the
Constitution. That instrument is literally silent about any such
right. We, on the contrary, deny that such a right has any existence
in the Constitution, even by implication.
Your purpose, then, plainly stated, is, that you will destroy the
Government, unless you be allowed to construe and enforce the
Constitution as you please, on all points in dispute between you and
us. You will rule or ruin in all events.
17 7
The absence of any "right, plainly written down in the Constitution"-
the emphasis on textual silence-would return, just over a year later,
in Lincoln's First Inaugural: "Is it true, then, that any right, plainly
written in the Constitution, has been denied?" 178 And again, just as
Lincoln emphasized at Cooper Union, he likewise said in the First
Inaugural: "If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should
deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might,
in a moral point of view, justify revolution-certainly would, if such
right were a vital one. But such is not our case.
' 179
At Cooper Union, Lincoln clearly marked this line of distinction
between the written Constitution, as properly interpreted, and an erroneous
177 Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27, 1860)
[hereinafter Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute], in LINCOLN 1859-1865, supra note
68, at 111, 125-26.
178 Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, supra note 68, at 219.
179 Id.
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decision of the Supreme Court, in terms of the legitimacy of any claim that
Republicans were disloyal to the Constitution itself. Indeed, the
whole burden of the first half of the long Cooper Union address was
devoted to proving, systematically, that the Court's interpretation in
Dred Scott did not comport with the original understanding of the
framing generation concerning the constitutional power of the
national government to limit or prohibit slavery in federal territo-
ries. l8 ° The Constitution, properly construed, did not make the Mis-
souri Compromise unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's decision
was wrong. Lincoln's position, not the Court's, was the one consistent
with the intent of "our fathers," from Washington on, until days of
late.
18 1
Lincoln then turned to the authoritativeness, of lack thereof, of
the Dred Scott decision. He acknowledged that the Court had ruled in
favor of the Southern position, but soft-pedaled its authority, sug-
gesting (all in one brisk paragraph) that it was dictum, made by a
divided Court, subject to conflicting interpretations, and-the truest
point, but the most sweeping one-mistaken on the merits:
Perhaps you will say the Supreme Court has decided the disputed
Constitutional question in your favor. Not quite so. But waiving the
lawyer's distinction between dictum and decision, the Court have
decided the question for you in a sort of way. The Court have sub-
stantially said, it is your Constitutional right to take slaves into the
federal territories, and to hold them there as property. When I say
the decision was made in a sort of way, I mean it was made in a
divided Court, by a bare majority of the Judges, and they not quite
agreeing with one another in the reasons for making it; that it is so
made as that its avowed supporters disagree with one another about
its meaning, and that it was mainly based upon a mistaken state-
ment of fact-the statement in the opinion that "the right of prop-
erty in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution."
182
Lincoln then proceeded to argue that the alleged right was not in fact
"distinctly and expressly affirmed" by the Constitution. Thus, Lincoln
asked rhetorically: "When this obvious mistake of the Judges shall be
brought to their notice, is it not reasonable to expect that they will
withdraw the mistaken statement, and reconsider the conclusion
based upon it?"183
180 See Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, supra note 177, at 111-20.
181 See id. at 119-20.
182 Id. at 126 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451
(1857)).
183 Id. at 127.
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As an argument against the prospective force of Dred Scott as the
governing judicial interpretation of the law, Lincoln was preaching to
a Northern choir. 184 Northerners, persuaded of Dred Scott's wrong-
ness, might wish that a reasonable Court would reconsider its own
plain error. Many could express such a fervent hope, and perhaps
even cast it as a reasonable expectation. But the real rhetorical appeal
of the suggestion, to a sympathetic audience, was not in the expecta-
tion that the Court, as constituted, would take any such step; the
appeal of the argument was its suggestion of the propriety of not
acquiescing in the decision, with the hope of having it overruled even-
tually by changing the political composition of the Court. 185
There is no reason, however, to think that Southerners would find
it "reasonable to expect" that the Court would reconsider and reverse
its expressed view in Dred Scott and decide the issue the other way, let
alone that it should do so. Quite the contrary, prominent Southern
politicians thought the decision was right, that they had won the con-
stitutional debate fair and square, and that it was now the duty of all
fair-minded political actors and officials to obey and implement the
constitutional holdings of the Dred Scott case.186 Anything less was a
breach of constitutional faith. To Lincoln's further rhetorical ques-
tion, supposedly directed to the people of the South-"do you really
feel yourselves justified to break up this Government, unless such a
court decision as yours is, shall be at once submitted to as a conclusive
and final rule of political action?" 187 -many of the prominent politi-
184 See HOLZER, supra note 175, at 132 (noting how Lincoln's words, though in
form directed at the South, were really "an elaborate attempt to ingratiate himself
with his Northern audiences by rallying them around rational, unifying sentiments
that the South should entertain if only they were only reasonable on the issue of slav-
ery, and believed what the 'fathers' really intended").
185 Senator William H. Seward, a leading contender for the Republican nomina-
tion for President and the man who later would become Lincoln's Secretary of State,
expressed the anticipated method for having the Supreme Court reconsider and over-
rule its decision, in 1858: "'[W]e shall reorganize the court, and thus reform its politi-
cal sentiments and practices,'" he said. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 2, at 454 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 943 (1858)). The means of accomplishing this
would be "to take the government out of unjust and unfaithful hands, and commit it
to those which will be just and faithful." Id. As Fehrenbacher summed it up: "[T]he
Republican remedy for the Dred Scott decision was to win the election of 1860,
change the personnel of the Court, and have the decision reversed." Id. As shown
above, this is consistent with Lincoln's 1858 statements in the Lincoln-Douglas
debates, both that Republicans would seek to have the decision overruled and that he
expected the decision would not be sustained if the Democratic Party supporting it
was not sustained in the elections. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
186 See infra text accompanying notes 192-213.
187 Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, supra note 177, at 127.
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cal men of the South would answer, emphatically, yes. Indeed, that
threat already existed at the time Lincoln spoke at Cooper Union,
nearly eight months before the election. Lincoln recognized as much:
"But you will not abide the election of a Republican president!"' 38
Indeed, they would not-and did not. Lincoln, the surprise
Republican presidential nominee at Chicago, then benefited from a
split in the national Democratic Party and won the presidential elec-
tion with a sweep of the northern tier of states and virtually no votes
south of the Mason-Dixon line. 189 The election of Lincoln was the
trigger for secession. On November 10, 1860-just four days after the
election-the South Carolina legislature called for a state convention
to consider secession. 190 Within a month, every state in the deep
south had started down the road to secession. 191
To many Southerners, the fact that Lincoln was an antislavery
Republican was itself sufficient provocation-an outrage upon South-
ern rights and dignity, and a dagger pointed at their very lives.
Others, more concerned to cast secession in constitutional terms,
found in Lincoln's anti-judicial supremacy, anti-Dred Scott stance the
legal justification for invoking the supposed Jeffersonian-Calhounian
power of each state to judge that the constitutional compact had been
violated by the national government, and to choose an appropriate
remedy.1 92 Thus, in the long secession winter from Lincoln's election
in November 1860 to his inauguration in March 1861, one of the
interesting props of the Southern argument for the legal propriety of
secession was the illegitimacy of Lincoln's stance on the constitutional
authority of Dred Scott.
193
It would be a mistake to emphasize too greatly the role of high
(and low) constitutional theory in the Southern argument for the
188 Id.
189 See DONALD, supra note 23, at 255-56.
190 See id. at 257.
191 See id. For a history of the Southern states' preinauguration secession, see gen-
erally id. at 257-67; MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 234-46.
192 For outstanding treatments of the various Southern constitutional theories
underlying the ideas of interposition, nullification, and secession, see DANIEL FARBER,
LINCOI.N'S CONSTITUTION 57-91 (2003); WItIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL
WAR (1st Harper Torchbook ed. 1968); 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO Disu-
NION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY 1776-1854 (1990); see also DAVID P. CURIE, THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM 1829-1861, at 228-237 (2005)
(discussing the constitutional arguments for and against the validity of secession, and
siding with the latter position).
193 It was certainly enough of a factor that Lincoln felt compelled to respond to
the point at some length in his First Inaugural, as we shall see presently. See infra Part
IV.A.
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validity of secession. The argument for secession was always a mixture
of political rhetoric, claims to the right of self-government (in the tra-
dition of the Declaration of Independence), purported moral outrage
at the North for real and imagined grievances, and high-flown consti-
tutional argument. Moreover, where Southern political men dis-
cussed violations of their "rights," they did not always distinguish
carefully among their claimed political rights, natural law moral
rights, and legal constitutional rights; the arguments often interwove
these strands. 194 But there is enough of explicitly constitutional argu-
ment to make clear that a substantial part of the South's justification
for secession was the claim that the North, by the election of Lincoln,
had violated-or soon would-the constitutional compact. 195 And
part of that alleged violation was Lincoln's refusal to accept the
Supreme Court's resolution of the constitutional issues decided in
Dred Scott.
Consider, for example, the Christmas Eve 1860 congressional
speech of Senator Nicholson of Tennessee and the New Year's Eve
1860 farewell speech of Senator Benjamin of Louisiana. Both
speeches invoked the authority of the Supreme Court to resolve-
finally, in a binding fashion on the entire nation and upon all political
authorities-constitutional controversies that arose within the Court's
jurisdiction. Both speeches also cited the Republicans' (including the
President-elect's) refusal to accept this fundamental principle as a
grave breach of the Constitution, triggering the right of the states to
act in response to such violation in ways they judged appropriate.
Hear Senator Nicholson:
This [Republican] party promises us, as the inducement to our
repose, that our rights of property in slaves shall not be interfered
with in the States, because the Constitution recognizes those rights.
But they refuse to extend that promise to our rights of property in slaves
outside of the States, although, upon the authority of the high judicial tribu-
nal of the country for deciding constitutional questions, we have exactly
the same rights outside of the States, within the jurisdiction of the
Federal Government, as the owners of any other species of property
have. They concede our rights in the one case, because they are
expressly recognized by the Constitution; they deny them in the
other, and in so doing, repudiate the authoritative adjudication of the
Supreme Court.
194 MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 239-46.
195 See id. at 245 (noting how the Southern argument fit the description of "pre-
emptive counterrevolution").
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... It was to secure repose that the South sought for years, and
with earnestness, to secure the recognition of congressional non-
intervention as the established policy of the country. Although this
principle has been declared by the Supreme Court to be the true intent and
meaning of the Constitution, we have failed to secure repose, because
the Republican party repudiated that solemn adjudication, and resolved to
continue the agitation of the question until its reversal could be
secured.196
Because of the Republicans' repudiation of the Supreme Court's adju-
dicated interpretation of the Constitution, the South could not rest
assured of its constitutional rights, Nicholson argued. "We can never
have repose until the right to hold slaves as other property is placed
beyond discussion and agitation. This can only be accomplished by
an express constitutional recognition of that right."197 This, in turn,
required the Republicans to repudiate their own platform, as a condi-
tion of the Southern states remaining in the Union; anything less
would remain a violation of the Constitution as declared by the
Supreme Court, and as understood by the slaveholding South.
It is for that reason that the South now demands this express recog-
nition as a necessary condition to a final and satisfactory settlement
of the issue between the North and the South, and to the preserva-
tion and perpetuation of the Federal Union.
, No State in the Confederacy has been more conservative in
its sentiments or more earnestly attached to the Federal Union than
that which I represent in part. To a just, constitutional Union that
attachment is as ardent and as earnest to-day as it ever was. But the
late election has been followed by the wide-spread conviction that
the principles on which the Republican party triumphed are incom-
patible with the continued existence of a just, constitutional Union;
and hence, in my judgment, the sentiment that is predominant in
that State is, that new guarantees for the future, to be ingrafted on
the Constitution, and to be unalterable, explicitly recognizing,
among others, the principles as to the rights of property in slaves
announced by the Supreme Court, in the late Dred Scott case, as
the supreme law of the land, must be obtained, or that a sacred
regard for the constitutional rights of her people will impel a major-
ity of them to demand a severance of her connection with a Union
which will then have ceased to be entitled to their allegiance. 198
To similar effect, Senator Benjamin argued that the Republicans'
stance violated the South's constitutional rights as determined by the
196 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1860) (statement of Sen. Nicholson)
(emphases added).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 187-88.
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Supreme Court. To telescope Senator's Benjamin's lengthy address:
Benjamin argued that secession, as already declared by South Caro-
lina-several other states, including Benjamin's own Louisiana, would
follow quickly-was not revolution. It was a "right inherent in her
under the very principles of the Constitution" as an appropriate rem-
edy for a "clear, palpable" violation of the Constitution, Benjamin
maintained, echoing Madison and Jefferson in the Virginia and Ken-
tucky resolutions condemning the Alien and Sedition acts of 1798.199
Where a matter was susceptible of judicial resolution, the Supreme
Court's resolutions were final and binding on all. 20 0 Thus was the
case with the Supreme Court's Dred Scott opinion concerning the con-
stitutional right to slave property in all federal territories, Benjamin
explained. 20' For the incoming administration to deny that right, and
seek to frustrate it, was no different in principle from a hypothetical
action of Congress refusing to seat South Carolina's senators. 20 2 If
such a violation were one not susceptible of judicial resolution-a
political question, in today's parlance-it would fall to the state in
question to judge as to the violation of its rights and the appropriate
remedy, including withdrawal. 203 And, Benjamin concluded, the
same reasoning applied to Lincoln's and the Republicans' refusal to
abide the determination of the Court in Dred Scott.
Hear Senator Benjamin in his own words on these points:
One State may allege that the compact has been broken, and others
may deny it: who is to judge? When pecuniary interests are involved
[read: the right of property in slaves], so that a case can be brought
up before courts of justice, the Constitution has provided a remedy
within itself.... [I] t has provided for a supreme judiciary to deter-
mine cases arising in law or equity which may involve the construc-
tion of the Constitution ....
199 Id. at 214 (statement of Sen. Benjamin). The Virginia and Kentucky Resolu-
tions, including Jefferson's original "nullification" draft, the answers of several other
states' legislatures, and Madison's "Report of 1800" for the Virginia legislature are
reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528-80 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila.,J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d
ed. 1891). For a brief analysis of the constitutional arguments for independent state
power to interpret the Constitution and resist perceived federal violations, see Paul-
sen, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 6, at 2734-38; Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 6, at 707-15.
200 See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 213 (1860) (statement of Sen.
Benjamin).
201 See id. at 214-15.
202 See id. at 214.
203 See id. at 214-15.
2008] 1273
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
But, sir, suppose infringements on the Constitution in political
matters, which from their very nature cannot be brought before the
court?
204
Senator Benjamin's line was clear. In cases susceptible of judicial res-
olution-like Dred Scott-the Supreme Court's determinations are
absolutely controlling. In cases not susceptible of judicial resolution
(Benjamin probably had a more traditional, nineteenth-century
understanding of justiciability than we do today), the issue was left
open. Senator Benjamin devoted several more paragraphs of discus-
sion to the Framers' decisions not to provide for any authoritative
mechanism for resolution of such differences.2 0 5 He was headed in
the direction of the stock Southern argument that, as to such issues,
each state ultimately must be permitted to decide for itself. But, for
our purposes, the interesting point that came next was Benjamin's
equating of a hypothetical denial by the North to a Southern state of
its right to equal representation in the United States Senate with the
North's actual or threatened denial of Southern states' rights to
extend slavery to the territories, as those rights had been adjudicated
by the Supreme Court.
Now, Mr. President, if we admit, as we must, that there are cer-
tain political rights guarantied to the States of this Union by the
terms of the Constitution itself-rights political in their character,
and not susceptible of judicial decision-if any State is deprived of
any of those rights, what is the remedy? . . . For the purpose of
illustrating the argument upon this subject, let us suppose a clear,
palpable case of violation of the Constitution. Let us suppose that
the State of South Carolina, having sent two Senators to sit upon
this floor, had been met by a resolution of the majority here that,
according to her just weight in the Confederacy, one was enough,
and that we had directed our Secretary to swear in but one, and to
call but one name on our roll as the yeas and nays are called for
voting. The Constitution says that each State shall be entitled to two
Senators and each Senator shall have one vote. What power is there
to force the dominant majority to repair that wrong? Any court?
Any tribunal? Has the Constitution provided any recourse
whatever? Has it not remained designedly silent on the subject of
that recourse? And yet, what man will stand up in this Senate and
pretend that if, under these circumstances, the State of South Caro-
lina had declared, "I entered into a Confederacy or a compact by
which I was to have my rights guarantied by the constant presence
of two Senators upon your floor; you allow me but one; you refuse
204 Id. at 213.
205 See id. at 213-14.
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to repair the injustice; I withdraw;" what man would dare say that
that was a violation of the Constitution on the part of South Caro-
lina? Who would say that was a revolutionary remedy? Who would
deny the plain and palpable proposition that it was the exercise of a
right inherent in her under the very principles of the Constitution,
and necessarily so inherent for self-defense?
20 6
Senator Benjamin's argument thus far was a pretty good one. If a
state were denied a clear constitutional right, such as equal represen-
tation in the Senate-if a state were in effect kicked out of the
national government (which is pretty much how the South viewed the
election of Lincoln)-would not such a state, in the absence of any
judicial remedy, be constitutionally justified in seceding, for so material
a breach of the Constitution?
20 7
Senator Benjamin's next step was to argue that, in effect, the
North's refusal to honor Dred Scott, the Supreme Court's authoritative
resolution of an issue of property rights, was likewise a material breach
of the Constitution (and, by implication, one not readily remediable
by further judicial decision):
Suppose this violation occurs under circumstances where it
does not appear so plain to you, but where it does appear equally
plain to South Carolina: then you are again brought back to the
irrevocable point, who is to decide? South Carolina says, "You
forced me to the expenditure of my treasure, you forced me to the
shedding of the blood of my people, by a majority vote, and with my
aid you acquired territory; now I have a constitutional right to go
into that territory with my property, and to be there secured by your
laws against its loss." You say, no, she has not. Now there is this to
be said: that right is not put down in the Constitution in quite so
clear terms as the right to have two Senators; but it is a right which
she asserts with the concurrent opinion of the entire South.... It is
a right that she asserts... in accordance with the opinion expressed
by the Supreme Court of the United States; but yet there is no tribu-
nal for the assertion of that political right. Is she without a remedy
under the Constitution? If not, then what tribunal? If none is pro-
vided, then natural law and the law of nations tell you that she and
206 Id. at 214.
207 Today, lawyers might conjure a decent argument that refusal to seat a state's
senators would be justiciable, but Senator Benjamin's point remains. See Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-49 (1969). But cf United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495
U.S. 385, 389-96 (1990) (finding ajusticiable controversy in the House of Represent-
atives' decision to exclude an elected member).
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she alone, from the very necessity of the case, must be the judge of
the infraction and of the mode and measure of redress.
20 8
Senators Nicholson and Benjamin are not the only exemplars of
these views, but they are among the most lucid and clear. The consti-
tutional argument for the validity of secession because of the Republi-
cans' defiance of the Constitution, as determined by the Supreme
Court in Dred Scott, was sufficiently pervasive that Professor Harry V.
Jaffa, one of the leading historians of the era, has called it "the driving
force behind secession." 20 9 Drawing on a wealth of prominent exam-
ples, from Senator (and future Confederate President) Jefferson Davis
to the secession ordinances enacted by South Carolina and other
states, Jaffa notes that the South "consolidated politically under the
banner of [the Supreme Court's] interpretation of the 'old Constitu-
tion."' 2 10 The Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott, Lincoln to the
contrary notwithstanding, was the Constitution. The South
"expended boundless moral indignation against the Republicans ...
who dared to question the literal identification of Taney's opinion
with the Constitution itself. That Lincoln and the Republican Party
intended to deprive them of their constitutional right to extend slav-
ery was the driving force behind secession."211 The South may have
regarded the several states as sovereign for purposes of determining
whether to withdraw from the Union for perceived violations of polit-
ical rights under the Constitution-d la Senator Judah Benjamin. But
the underlying violation itself was sufficiently established by the refusal
of the North to accept the binding constitutional determination of the
Supreme Court in Dred Scott in favor of the South's understanding of
the constitutional compact. The Supreme Court's decision established
the rule, finally, once and for all. The North's-Lincoln's-refusal to
accept the Supreme Court's final authority established the violation of
that rule, which in turn provided, for many, sufficient constitutional
justification for invoking the sovereign state prerogative of secession,
under standard Calhounian theory. As Professor Jaffa succinctly put
it: "The Constitution had established the Supreme Court as the arbi-
ter between the [majority and the minority]. If the antislavery major-
ity refused to accept that arbitration, then it refused to accept the
Constitution. That is how the South identified secession from the
208 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 214-15 (1860) (statement of Sen.
Benjamin).




LINCOLN AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Union as a defense of the Constitution."212 Jaffa continues: "And that
is the argument that Lincoln tried to defuse, so far as possible," imme-
diately upon taking office, in his First Inaugural.
213
To Lincoln's Inaugural, and his presidency, we now turn. At
every juncture, Lincoln's stance as President confirmed the South's
fears: as President, Abraham Lincoln never accepted, never acqui-
esced to, never enforced, sometimes actively opposed, and on occa-
sion directly disobeyed, Supreme Court decisions-most notably Dred
Scott-that he considered contrary to the Constitution's proper
understanding.
IV. 1861-1865: PRESIDENT LINCOLN
Finally, we reach the words, and actions, of Lincoln as President.
With Lincoln's ascent to the presidency, the secession of the lower
South, the firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln's call for troops to suppress
the rebellion, and the subsequent secession of much of the upper
South, issues of constitutional theory became the subjects of Civil War.
In the crucible of that war, Lincoln's theoretical opposition to judicial
supremacy, articulated as a Senate candidate back in 1858, reached its
apex and received its implementation.
I will consider, and distill, three events. First, Lincoln's First
Inaugural, in an often quoted passage, reiterates his denial of judicial
supremacy and his refusal to accept Dred Scott as a political rule.
2 14
Second, when judicial push came to executive shove at the outbreak
of the Civil War, President Lincoln refused to abide by the final judgment
and order of the federal judiciary. Chief Justice Taney, acting either as
Circuit Justice or on his authority as a single Justice of the Supreme
Court, had issued a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual held
in military custody, declared Lincoln's suspension of the writ uncon-
stitutional, held one of Lincoln's generals to be in contempt, and
ordered Lincoln to enforce orders of the court.2 1 5 Lincoln declined
to do so. Lincoln's justification was his disagreement with Taney's
decision on the merits. 2 16 Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward Bates,
followed with an elaborate legal opinion that, in addition to defend-
212 Id. at 342.
213 Id.
214 See infra text accompanying notes 222-42.
215 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149, 152-53 (Taney, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
216 See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861)
[hereinafter Lincoln, Message to Congress], in LINCOLN 1859-1865, supra note 68, at
246, 252-53.
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ing Lincoln's position on the merits of the writ suspension, denied the
authority of the judiciary to issue binding orders to the executive.
21 7
Third, in at least three distinct situations, Lincoln's administra-
tion, sometimes with the active support of Congress, acted in direct
contravention of the Court's decision in Dred Scott. The Court had
held that Congress could not ban slavery in the territories; Congress
enacted such a ban on June 19, 1862, and Lincoln signed it into law,
in defiance of Dred Scott.21 8 The Court had held that blacks could not
be citizens of the United States; Lincoln's administration issued pat-
ents to blacks, which depended on the conclusion that they were citi-
zens of the United States. 219 And finally, Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation, predicated on his military authority as Commander in
Chief,220 at once accepted Dred Scott's premise that slaves were prop-
erty (which is what justified their wartime seizure as enemy materiel)
and eviscerated Dred Scott's declared constitutional protection of the
"due process" right to own such property by ordering its permanent
confiscation/liberation. 221 Let us consider each of these three epi-
sodes in more detail.
A. Lincoln's First Inaugural
By Inauguration Day, March 4, 1861, six states had passed ordi-
nances of secession (South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Loui-
siana, and Texas), joined together as the Confederate States of
America under a new constitution, and sworn in Jefferson Davis as
their first president. 222 Lincoln faced an unprecedented constitu-
tional crisis. In the four months since his election, the Union had
effectively collapsed, at least politically.
217 See 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74 (1861). On the Mernyman incident, see infra text
accompanying notes 243-305.
218 Act ofJune 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432; see also David P. Currie, The Civil War
Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1147 (2006) ("In the teeth of the Dred Scott decision,
Congress abolished slavery both in the territories and in the District of Columbia.");
infra text accompanying notes 306-10.
219 See Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opin-
ions, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1041, 1053 (1987); infra text accompanying note 311.
220 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Com-
mander in Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807, 814-23 (2006) (explaining and defending
the constitutional basis for and the validity of the Emancipation Proclamation); infra
text accompanying notes 313-16.
221 SeeAbraham Lincoln, Final Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) [herein-
after Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation], in LINCOLN 1859-1865, supra note 68, at
424, 424-25.
222 See DONALD, supra note 23, at 267.
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Lincoln's First Inaugural Address is an outstanding work of legal
analysis, if less memorable than some of Lincoln's other works as
political rhetoric and inspiration. It is mostly logos, with very little
pathos until the peroration. The Address is primarily a legal brief set-
ting forth Lincoln's bedrock constitutional positions: his position on
the constitutional status of slavery, including the power of the national
government over slavery in the territories; his position on judicial
authority (and, implicitly, his views on the Dred Scott case); his position
on the permanence of the Union and the constitutional illegality of
secession; and his position on the resulting authority of the national
government, and his personal sworn duty as President, to maintain
the Union, by force if necessary. 223
For my purposes here, the key part of the First Inaugural's legal
analysis is Lincoln's discussion ofjudicial authority. After setting forth
his positions on the constitutional status of slavery and the perma-
nence and inviolability of the Union, Lincoln turned to the question
of how differences of opinion on constitutional questions are to be
addressed and resolved in a democratic government. Lincoln's
answer is mildly startling to modern ears. Such constitutional ques-
tions, Lincoln said, ultimately are to be resolved by the judgments of a
free people, in elections. 224 He did not say-he clearly denied-that
such constitutional disagreements "upon vital questions, affecting the
whole people" are to be resolved, authoritatively and finally, by the
Supreme Court.
2 25
The final paragraph of the passage set forth below is the one
most often quoted as setting forth Lincoln's views on the authority of
Supreme Court decisions. But it loses something of its context and
punch without the point made in the paragraphs that immediately
precede it-the supremacy of popular constitutional interpretation.
Lincoln's main point, clinched in the final paragraph, is the rather
bracing one that judicial supremacy is fundamentally inconsistent with con-
stitutional democracy.
All profess to be content in the Union, if all constitutional
rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right plainly writ-
ten in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the
223 Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 68, at 215-24. For fuller discussion of
these legal arguments, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia
Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 291, 301-25 (2002); Paulsen, The Civil War as Consti-
tutional Interpretation, supra note 6, at 703-26. For a brilliant analysis of the First Inau-
gural, including its evolution through early drafts as a window on Lincoln's modes of
thought and writing, see WILSON, supra note 48, at 42-70.
224 See Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 68, at 220.
225 Id. at 221.
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human mind is so constituted, that no party can reach to the audac-
ity of doing this. Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a
plainly written provision of the Constitution has ever been denied.
If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minor-
ity of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral
point of view, justify revolution-certainly would, if such right were
a vital one. But such is not our case .... Shall fugitives from labor
be surrendered by national or by State authority? The Constitution
does not expressly say. May Congress prohibit slavery in the territo-
ries? The Constitution does not expressly say. Must Congress pro-
tect slavery in the territories? The Constitution does not expressly
say.
From questions of this class spring all our constitutional contro-
versies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If
the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the govern-
ment must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing the
government, is acquiescence on one side or the other....
Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy.
A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limita-
tions, and always changing easily, with deliberate changes of popu-
lar opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free
people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to
despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a per-
manent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the
majority principle, anarchy, or despotism in some form, is all that is
left.
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitu-
tional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I
deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the par-
ties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled
to very high respect and consideration, in all paralel [sic] cases, by
all other departments of the government. And while it is obviously
possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still
the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with
the chance that it may be over-ruled, and never become a precedent
for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a differ-
ent practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that
if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between par-
ties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own
rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government,
into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there, in this view,
any assault upon the court, or the judges. It is a duty, from which
they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them;
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and it is no fault of theirs, if others seek to turn their decisions to
political purposes.
22 6
There is much here. I begin with the neglected point: Lincoln's
conclusion, somewhat understated because wrapped in decorous and
even a bit elliptical language (Lincoln's original draft made the point
more crisply, but also more harshly), is that the claim of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation is the inadmissible rule of a
minority over a majority-an example of "despotism."2 27  The
Supreme Court's decisions cannot be supreme over the people. A
majority, as determined by free elections, "is the only true sovereign of
a free people"-not the decisions of the Court. Lincoln was fully
aware of the position, "assumed by some," that the Court's constitu-
tional determinations fix the policy of government. But that view is
badly wrong. Accepting it would be to resign popular government
into the hands of the Supreme Court.
Lincoln hedged this conclusion carefully, to soften the blow. The
Court's decisions are binding on the parties to the case, and they are
entitled to respectful consideration by all other branches of govern-
ment. But no more. The Court's decisions conclude the case. A par-
ticular decision-think Dred Scott-might be wrong and unjust. But
that is tolerable, given that the case may be overruled in a subsequent
one, and not become a precedent. (Again, recall that the Republi-
cans were hoping to alter the composition of the Court by attrition,
appointments, or perhaps augmenting its membership, eventually
overruling Dred Scott in such a manner.) What is not tolerable is to
226 Id. at 219-21.
227 See WILSON, supra note 48, at 63. Wilson reports that Lincoln's draft of this
section had read, until late in the process (when he accepted many of Seward's pro-
posed editorial changes), as follows:
But if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole
people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, it is
plain that the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having turned
their government over to the despotism of the few life-officers composing the Court.
Id. (emphasis added). In the draft, the linkage of "despotism" to the individual Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court is absolutely explicit. As delivered, the line is softened
considerably, with a peculiar obsequious bow in the direction of these despots. The
meaning, however, remains reasonably clear:
At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevo-
cably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, made in the ordinary course
of litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased
to be their own rulers, having practically resigned their government into the hands
of that eminent tribunal.
Id. (emphasis added).
2008] 1281
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
regard the decision of the Supreme Court as concluding the constitu-
tional question for the whole government.
Lincoln, diplomatically and perhaps a bit disingenuously, said
that this stance entailed no "assault" upon the Court, or its judges. 228
It is not the judges' fault; they decide as they think proper; and it is
only others who "seek to turn their decisions to political purposes." 229
But of course, Lincoln had said many times before that Dred Scott was
improper, a lawless "astonisher," and indeed part of a conspiracy to
nationalize and entrench slavery through judicial decision.23 11 It was
the judges themselves who had rendered a political decision without
foundation in the Constitution. There is, in such view, an assault on
the Court. And there is also an assault on the notion of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation. That notion was, to Lin-
coln, antidemocratic. Still worse, it was despotic. And Dred Scott was the
proof.
Lincoln probably could not have retreated from the substance of
his 1858 stance against the Court even had he wanted to do so. And
there is no evidence that he wanted to retreat. During the secession
winter of 1860-1861, when compromises and appeasements of all
sorts were being debated in Washington, the word from Springfield
had been to remain firm.23 1 The ground on which the election had
been won-the platform of restricting slavery's expansion into the ter-
ritories-must not be yielded. 23 2 To so yield would be to negate the
value of free elections and constitutional government itself-a theme
President Lincoln would invoke often, from his July 4, 1861 message
to Congress 23 3 to the Gettysburg Address. 23 4 But that of course also
meant refusing to yield to the Court's decision in Dred Scott and refus-
228 See Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 68, at 221.
229 Id.
230 See Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech, supra note 44, at 426-34; Lincoln,
Speech at Chicago, supra note 76, at 451.
231 See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 23, at 268-70; MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 231.
232 See DONALD, supra note 23, at 267-70.
233 See Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 216, at 260 (insisting "that when
ballots have fairly, and constitutionally, decided, there can be no successful appeal,
back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal, except to ballots themselves, at
succeeding elections); id. at 261 ("[N]o popular government can long survived a
marked precedent, that those who carry an election, can only save the government
from immediate destruction, by giving up the main point, upon which the people
gave the election.").
234 See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in
LINCOLN 1859-1865, supra note 68, at 536 ("[T]hat government of the people, by the
people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.").
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ing to bow to the Court's authority to resolve constitutional questions
for the nation through the vehicle of adjudicated cases.
There was another, even more fundamental, reason why no
retreat was possible from Lincoln's assault on judicial supremacy. It is
not often given great attention in the history books, but it surely must
have been on Lincoln's mind: to accede to the Court's authority to
decide, finally, vital constitutional questions affecting the whole peo-
ple would mean that the Court could decide on the constitutional
validity of secession and federal power to "coerce" states to remain in
the Union. That was now the vital question of the day, far more imme-
diate and pressing even than the question that had spawned the cri-
sis-the question of power over slavery in the territories. Lincoln was
irrevocably committed to the constitutional permanency of the Union
and considered it his duty as President to preserve it. These were the
central themes of the First Inaugural. If he was to hold and maintain
that position, there could be no backtracking on the question of judi-
cial supremacy.
Might the Taney Court actually have held that the national gov-
ernment lacked constitutional authority to coerce seceding states to
remain in the Union? That was the issue of the hour, and it is not at
all implausible to think the Court would have held against national
coercive power. That was, after all, outgoing President Buchanan's
position. His final message to Congress blamed the secession crisis on
Northern Republicans and the antislavery movement generally. 23 5 He
argued, sensibly, that secession was unconstitutional. 23 6 But then, in
the next breath, he concluded, incredibly, that the federal govern-
ment lacked any power to prevent it; there was no constitutional
authority by which the Union could make war on the states.
237
235 SeeJames Buchanan, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1860), in 5 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 60, at 626, 626.
236 See id. at 628-34 ("In order to justify secession as a constitutional remedy, it
must be on the principle that the Federal Government is a mere voluntary association
of States, to be dissolved at pleasure by any one of the contracting parties .... Such a
principle is wholly inconsistent with the history as well as the character of the Federal
Constitution.").
237 See id. at 634-37; see also MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 248 ("Buchanan's force-
ful denial of the legality of disunion ended with a lame confession of impotence to do
anything about it. Although the Constitution gave no state the right to withdraw, said
the president, it also gave the national government no power 'to coerce a State into
submission which is attempting to withdraw.'"). Republicans and others rightly ridi-
culed Buchanan's analysis. See id. (noting Seward's sarcastic, skewering characteriza-
tion of Buchanan's position as being that "no state has the right to secede unless it
wishes to" and that "it is the President's duty to enforce the laws, unless somebody
opposes him" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also WILSON, supra note 48, at
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There is clear historical evidence that Chief Justice Taney held
much the same position and had written it up at fair length in private
correspondence. 238 There seems little doubt that, had the issue been
presented to him in judicial form at the Supreme Court, and if he had
had the supporting votes (which was likely, at least before Southern
Justices resigned), Taney would have had little hesitation in ruling
against the power of the Union to prevent secession by force. 239 Imag-
ine, then, a case brought by Virginia against the United States, seeking
to prohibit the "invasion" of federal armies into its territory in transit
to make war on another state. Who is to say that the Taney Court
might not have held such invasion illegal? Even if the legal reasoning
required to support such a conclusion might be thought dubious, or
the justiciability of such an issue even more dubious, is it impossible to
believe that the Court that decided Dred Scott as it did might not reach
such a disabling conclusion?
There could be no retreat from Lincoln's anti-judicial supremacy
stance, politically or practically. The First Inaugural Address makes
none, other than (perhaps) some cosmetic softening of tone. Lin-
coln's position remained firm: secession was unconstitutional; it was
unjustified by any legitimate constitutional objection to his substantive
positions on slavery (including his opposition to Dred Scott); and judi-
50-51 (noting that "Buchanan seemed completely at a loss to know what to do about
the secession of the Southern states" and recounting some contemporary criticism of
him).
238 SeeJAMEs F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY 180-81, 193-95 (2006).
239 See id. at 194-95. Throughout his tenure as Chief Justice, Taney was a strong
defender of states' rights and powers, especially with respect to slavery. Taney had
authored an important opinion holding that a constitutional provision that required
certain action by states, as a matter of federal law-rendition of fugitives charged with
a crime upon request of the governor of the state seeking the fugitive's return-but
that did not expressly authorize federal compulsion to enforce such requirement, left
compliance with the federal constitutional requirement to the good faith of the states
in question. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-08 (1861); cf. Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536, 626-33 (1842) (Taney, C.J., concurring)
(emphasizing states' duties to return fugitive slaves, and affirming state powers in this
area, as long as they were not exercised in a manner contrary to the Constitution's
requirements); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 508 (1841) (Taney, C.J.,
concurring) (opining that power over slavery "is exclusively with the several states...
and the action of the several States upon this subject, cannot be controlled by Con-
gress, either by virtue of its power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any other
power"). On Taney's pro-states-fights positions generally, see Carl Brent Swisher, Mr.
ChiefJustice Taney, in MR. JUSTICE 35, 38-39, 41-56 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kur-
land eds., rev. ed. 1964). Ironically, as AndrewJackson's attorney general, Taney had
taken the opposite stance with respect to federal coercive power, during the South
Carolina nullification crisis. See SIMON, supra note 238, at 15-17.
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cial decisions to the contrary were not binding against national
authority to enforce the Constitution in accordance with Lincoln's
understanding of it, and in accordance with the electoral decisions of
the people.240 Lincoln would not be so bound, but would seek to
hold federal property and enforce federal law throughout the unbro-
ken Union. 241 The South was probably right, from its own perspec-
tive, in seeing the address as un-conciliatory. 242 There would be no
concession to the South's demands and no retreat from Lincoln's
prior positions.
And the war came.
B. Lincoln's Defiance of Taney's Order in Ex Parte Merryman
By the time Congress reconvened on July 4, 1861, Fort Sumter
had been lost and Lincoln had taken a number of extraordinary
actions on his own authority, including suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. 243 That action produced the most notable instance of
presidential defiance ofjudicial authority in our nation's history, aris-
ing from Lincoln's noncompliance with Chief Justice Taney's decision
in Ex parte Meryman,244 purporting to invalidate Lincoln's suspension
of the privilege of the writ.245 This event was the most extreme and
dramatic instance of Lincoln's denial ofjudicial supremacy, extending
that stance even to final judicial decrees in a particular case-break-
ing through the limits that Lincoln himself had declared as a Senate
candidate responding to Dred Scott in 1857 and 1858, and which he
had reaffirmed in his First Inaugural barely a month earlier.
I have told this story before, but it is worth repeating in somewhat
abbreviated form.2 4 6 On April 12, 1861, South Carolina attacked Fort
Sumter. 247 Thirty-four hours later, the Fort was surrendered to the
240 See Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 68, at 220-21.
241 See id. at 217-18, 220-21.
242 See DONALD, supra note 23, at 284.
243 See MCPHERSON, supra note 64, 287-90.
244 17 F. Cas. 144 (Taney, CircuitJustice, C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
245 See id. at 152-53.
246 For the full tale, see Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 88-99; see
also Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6, at 276-84 (describing Merryman
and Lincoln's resistance thereto); cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Neces-
sity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1268-71 (2004) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Constitu-
tion of Necessity] (discussing the Merryman situation in connection with Lincoln's
invocation of "necessity"). For other accounts, see DONALD, supra note 23, at
296-301; MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 285-88 (1988); SIMON, supra note 238, at
177-98.
247 See DONALD, supra note 23, at 292.
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rebels. 248 The attack on Sumter produced a surge of Union patriot-
ism in the North. On April 15, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling
for 75,000 militiamen to enforce the laws and suppress the rebellion,
to widespread Northern approval.249 But the upper South viewed the
action as aggression against its southern neighbors. Within weeks,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and, most significantly, Vir-
ginia, situated on Washington, D.C.'s southern border, voted to
secede as well. 250 These actions produced the traitorous defections of
numerous important officers in the United States Army, including
Robert E. Lee, who had been offered command of Union forces but
repudiated his oath of loyalty and accepted command of Confederate
forces.
251
On Washington, D.C.'s northern border-and its western and
eastern borders-loomed the state of Maryland, a hotbed of secession-
ist sympathy. There was a danger that Maryland, too, would seek to
secede.252 The capital city was literally surrounded by strong seces-
sionist, anti-Union elements. 2 5 3 On April 19, a Massachusetts regi-
ment headed for Washington was attacked by mobs in Baltimore when
the regiment transferred train stations.254 In addition, some Mary-
landers destroyed railroad bridges to keep Northern troops from trav-
eling through the state.255 As historian David Donald describes it:
"For nearly a week Washington was virtually under siege. Marylanders
destroyed the railroad bridges linking Baltimore with the North and
cut the telegraph lines. A Confederate assault from Virginia was
expected daily, and everyone predicted that it would be aided by the
thousands of secessionist sympathizers in the city." 2 5 6
It was in this context that Lincoln, on April 27, authorized com-
manding General Winfield Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
" [i] f at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line, which is now
used between the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington,"
Scott encountered resistance making such suspension necessary for
the "public safety."25 7 In the days and weeks following, the army
248 Id.
249 See id. at 296.
250 See id. at 297.
251 See id. at 298.
252 See id. at 297.
253 See id.
254 See id.
255 See id. at 298
256 Id.
257 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in LINCOLN
1859-1865, supra note 68, at 237, 237.
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arrested numerous suspected secessionists, includingJohn Merryman,
a lieutenant in a secessionist cavalry company that had burned bridges
and ripped down telephone wires. 258 Merryman, held at Fort
McHenry in Baltimore,25 9 obtained access to counsel, who filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus directly with Chief Justice Taney.
2 60
The choice of Taney was an astute one, as judge-shopping goes. The
habeas statute permitted a broad choice of judges, the Chief Justice
retained considerable prestige by virtue of his position, and the
author of Dred Scott was known as a fearless and harsh opponent of the
Republican administration.2 6' It also appears that Taney had
attended college with Merryman's father, years earlier.2
62
On May 26, 1861, Taney issued a writ directing the commanding
officer at Fort McHenry, General George Cadwaladar, to produce
Merryman before him in Baltimore the next day to adjudicate the law-
fulness of the detention. 263 General Cadwaladar instead sent a lucky
subordinate to inform the Chief Justice that President Lincoln had
suspended the writ and to ask for a delay so as to permit military
authorities to obtain instructions from President Lincoln. 264 Taney,
displeased, and evidently impatient as well, directed that an "attach-
ment" issue against General Cadwalader for contempt, returnable the
next day.2 6 5 Service of the writ was rebuffed at the gate of the Fort,2 6 6
and Taney issued an extended ruling from the bench the next day,
May 28, before a courtroom packed with spectators and the press.
267
Taney held that the general was in contempt of court and that Lin-
coln's writ suspension was unconstitutional, the suspending power
being exclusively Congress's in Taney's view. 268 Moreover, Taney
declared, the President had the purely ministerial duty to enforce the
legal orders and process of the courts. 269 Taney ordered General Cad-
walader's arrest and further directed that his opinions and orders
258 See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 90.
259 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md.
1861) (No. 9487).
260 See MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 288; Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra
note 6, at 90.
261 See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 90.
262 See id. at 91 n.2 7 .
263 See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 Id. at 147.
267 See id.
268 See id. at 148.
269 See id. at 149.
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immediately be transmitted to President Lincoln, with instructions
that they be enforced.
270
Taney's opinion took the view that the President must obey and
enforce the judicial department's interpretation of the law and its
orders:
The only power ... which the president possesses [is] "that he
shall take care that the laws shall be faithfully executed." He is not
authorized to execute them himself... but he is to take care that
they be faithfully carried into execution, as they are expounded and
adjudged by the co-ordinate branch of the government to which
that duty is assigned by the constitution. It is thus made his duty to
come in aid of the judicial authority... but in exercising this power
he acts in subordination to judicial authority, assisting it to execute
its process and enforce its judgments.
2 7 1
This is a flat assertion not only ofjudicial supremacy, but also of presi-
dential duty to obey and enforce judicial decrees-of presidential
subordinacy to judicial authority. What the judiciary decrees, the Presi-
dent must do. This is fairly stunning, when put so starkly. It went
further than any prior judicial assertion of power. As I have written
elsewhere, Taney's Merryman opinion was "arguably the first genuine
assertion of judicial supremacy in the sense of the courts telling the
President what he must do."
272
How could Lincoln respond to this, under the circumstances?
On the one hand, Taney's position on the binding authority of judg-
ments was essentially the same line Senate-candidate Lincoln had
drawn-judicial decrees were binding law for that case, but not liter-
ally controlling for public policy beyond the boundaries of that
case 27 3-and that President Lincoln had drawn in his First Inaugural,
noting that the "evil effect" of following judgments in specific cases
"can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice" but
that judgments in individual cases did not bind the policy of govern-
ment upon vital questions affecting the whole people. 274 On the
other hand, to accede to Taney's orders would be to concede the prin-
ciple that what the courts order, the President must implement, which
in effect would deny any and all independent presidential interpretive
power with respect to the Constitution and open Lincoln up to the
prospect of having to obey a "second Dred Scott" opinion making slav-
270 See id. at 153; Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 93.
271 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
272 Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 93.
273 See, e.g., supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
274 Lincoln, First Inaugural, supra note 68, at 221.
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ery national275 or, as discussed above, having to obey a Supreme Court
decision forbidding federal interference with state secession 276-Lin-
coln's nightmare parade of horribles. Taney's opinion had raised the
stakes by exposing how easily the line in the sand between judgments
and general judicial orders is erased. All it takes is ajudicial order, in
a specific case, ordering that all judicial opinions on constitutional
questions be treated as orders and followed prospectively on all mat-
ters of government policy, and the line is gone.2
7 7
Lincoln really had no choice. Taney's Merryman gauntlet ended
up forcing Lincoln to the full logical limits of his stance against judi-
cial supremacy. As between the alternatives of complete presidential
subordinacy to judicial interpretations of the Constitution and the
legitimacy of refusing to abide by and enforce even judicial judgments
in a particular case, Lincoln chose the latter horn of the dilemma. As
was typical of Lincoln's style as President, he avoided casting his
refusal in dramatic, in-your-face, confrontational terms. He did not
publicly proclaim his defiance of the court's order. But defiance it
was: he did not obey Taney's order, nor did his administration seek
any sort of appeal to the full Supreme Court.278 Lincoln's principled
stance against judicial supremacy as a general proposition, and the
costs of retreating from that stance in the face of Taney's order under
the circumstances, had ultimately led him to the conclusion that the
judiciary may not issue judgments that bind the independent constitu-
tional judgment of elected officials, even in the particular case.
Interestingly, the exercise of this presidential power to refuse to
execute judicial judgments even in the case rendered-what I have
elsewhere dubbed "The Menyman Power" and defended at length on
originalist, separation-of-powers principles 279-came in a case where
275 See supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
276 See supra Part W.A.
277 As I have argued elsewhere, the judicial-supremacy-as-to-judgments-but-not-
otherwise position completely collapses into judicial supremacy as to everything,
period. The distinction is a spurious one, whenever the slightest pressure is applied
to it. See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 99-103.
278 See Currie, supra note 218, at 1134 n.15; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL
THE LAWS BUT ONE 44-45 (1998) (noting the procedural obstacles and practical pros-
pects of appealing in Menyman and concluding that, "[g]iven th[e] makeup of the
Court, an appeal of the Menyman decision must have appeared to the administration
as a risky course of action, to be avoided if possible").
279 My first tentative foray into this issue was Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra
note 6, in which I argued merely that the principles of executive branch interpretive
autonomy and judicial supremacy are hopelessly inconsistent with each other, when
push comes to shove; and that every attempted reconciliation of those principles fails.
In subsequent scholarship, I have defended aggressively the position to which Lincoln
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the correct resolution of the issue on the merits (Does Congress
exclusively possess the writ suspension power or is it shared with the
President, who may exercise it in the absence of Congress?) was
extremely debatable. Taney possessed a good number of excellent
arguments on his side; perhaps, but for the circumstances of crisis,
Taney's abstract interpretation was the better one.280 At any rate, the
Men yman decision certainly was not the complete judicial outrage that
Dred Scott was. The only outrage, if outrage it be, was the assertion of
judicial supremacy and complete presidential subordinacy to the judi-
ciary's decrees. That was the proposition to which Lincoln could not,
and would not, accede. Lincoln's position was not, and could not be,
limited to the stance that the President could refuse to implement
judicial decisions in cases of "clear" judicial error, or "clear" disregard
for the Constitution, or of "atrocious" decisions, in legal or moral
terms. His position, as expressed by his (in)action, was that the Presi-
dent was not bound to obey and enforce judicial decrees that he
believed were incorrect, whenever circumstances suggested complying
with the decision would be in some meaningful way harmful to impor-
tant national interests.
Lincoln's message to Congress of July 4, 1861, addressed, among
other things,281 the propriety of his refusal to enforce Taney's Mer-
ryman decision. 28 2 It is interesting that Lincoln confined his discus-
sion to the merits of the underlying issue on which the executive and
the judicial branches had finally decided to take opposing positions;
he did not separately defend the propriety of the executive branch
taking, and continuing to take, a position opposed to the judiciary's
decrees. 283 Lincoln began by stating the reason for his suspension of
the writ, and the charge of illegality:
Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to
authorize the Commanding General, in proper cases, according to
his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
or, in other words, to arrest, and detain, without resort to the ordi-
nary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem
dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been
was driven reluctantly. See Paulsen, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 6, at 2724-27; Paul-
sen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6, at 223, 276-84; Paulsen, Nixon Now,
supra note 6, at 1337, 1345-68.
280 See Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, supra note 246, at 1268-72.
281 For a discussion of other themes of the July 4 message, see Kesavan & Paulsen,
supra note 223, at 305-13.
282 See Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 216, at 251-53.
283 See Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, supra note 246, at 1268-71; Paulsen,
The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 95.
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exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propri-
ety of what has been done under it, are questioned; and the atten-
tion of the country has been called to the proposition that one who
is sworn to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," should
not himself violate them.
28 4
Having framed the issue, Lincoln proceeded to defend his actions:
Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power,
and propriety, before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the
laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were being
resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States.
Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been
perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary to their exe-
cution, some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the
citizen's liberty, that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than
of the innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To
state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go unex-
ecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be vio-
lated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if
the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that
disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?
285
This was Lincoln's argument from necessity, which I have set forth
and defended elsewhere.28 6 It informs, and helps make more persua-
sive, Lincoln's argument from text, structure, purpose, logic, and
practicality, which follows.
But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not
believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitu-
tion that "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, shall not be
suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision-is a provision-
that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion, or
invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we
have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the
qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was author-
ized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Exec-
utive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself, is silent
as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed
the framers of the instrument intended, that in every case, the dan-
ger should run its course, until Congress could be called together;
284 Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 216, at 252 (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3).
285 Id. at 252-53.
286 See Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, supra note 246, at 1268-71.
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the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended
in this case, by the rebellion.
28 7
Notice what is missing: there is no direct response to Taney's assertion
that Lincoln was bound to enforce Taney's judgment to the contrary.
Lincoln's "argument" that the President is not bound by erroneous
judicial decisions was almost entirely an argument from silence,
implied by his rebuttal of Taney's arguments on the merits and the
fact that Lincoln was explaining why he had not gone along with
Taney's ruling. "No more extended argument is now offered," Lin-
coln said, closing out the discussion, "as an opinion, at some length,
will probably be presented by the Attorney General. '288 Lincoln thus
left the explicit constitutional argument to his Attorney General,
Edward Bates, who published a fascinating (if somewhat rambling)
formal legal opinion on July 5, the very next day.
2 89
The crux of Bates's opinion with respect to the judicial
supremacy issue was the Constitution's separation of powers. (Bates
also reargued the writ suspension power, at greater length but with
less persuasive power than Lincoln.) The design of the Constitution,
Bates argued, reflected the desire to avoid "unity of power," a "special
dread" of the Framers, and of the people. 290 Thus, the Constitution
deliberately divided the people's "sovereignty" among several
branches of government power, making none the superior of the
others.29 ' Echoing Madison's Federalist No. 49, Bates wrote that
"[t]hese departments are co-ordinate and coequal-that is, neither
being sovereign, each is independent in its sphere, and not
subordinate to the others, either of them or both of them
together."292 It followed that to allow "one of the three"-the judici-
ary-"to determine the extent of its own powers, and also the extent
of the powers of the other two," would mean that "that one can con-
trol the whole government. '" 29 3 (Note also the echoes of Lincoln's
First Inaugural with respect to vital questions affecting the "whole,"
287 Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 216, at 253 (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 2).
288 Id.
289 See 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74 (1861).
290 Id. at 76.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. The argument tracks Madison nearly identically: "The several departments
being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of
them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the bound-
aries between their respective powers." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 261 (James
Madison) (George W. Carey &James McClellan eds., 2001). For a complete side-by-
side of Bates and Madison, see Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 6, at 95-97.
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and the importance of the people not resigning "the government"
into the hands of the Supreme Court.)2 94 Thus, Bates observed, the
Framers designed a system where the branches, by virtue of that inde-
pendence and coequality, would "keep each other within their proper
spheres by their mutual antagonism-that is, by the system of checks
and balances, to which our fathers were driven at the beginning by
their fear of the unity of power.
'295
Bates then drew from these premises, fairly, the conclusion that
the judiciary could not boss the President around: "If it be true, as I
have assumed, that the President and the judiciary are co-ordinate
departments of government, and the one not subordinate to the
other," it was then not "legally possible for a judge to issue a com-
mand to the President to come before him ad subjiciendum---that is, to
submit implicitly to his judgment" and to be held "in contempt of a
superior authority" and fined or imprisoned if he disobeyed.
29 6
The late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in his engaging and
prescient book, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime, wrote of
Bates's opinion: "It was not a very good opinion. ' 29 7 But Rehnquist's
laconic analysis of Bates's opinion is itself not very good. Bates's opin-
ion, Rehnquist wrote, "essentially argued that each of the three
branches of the federal government established by the Constitution
was coequal with and independent of the other two." 29 8 That is a per-
plexing way to begin a critique of Bates's argument, for surely there is
nothing wrong-nothing at all-with this proposition. Indeed, it is
the essence of the idea of separation of powers and fully consistent
with James Madison's explanation of this vital principle in Federalist
No. 49.299 Rehnquist continued: "The President was thus not
subordinate to the judicial branch, and so the latter could nor order
him, or his subordinates, to free Merryman." 300 Rehnquist did not try
to explain why this conclusion should not follow from the axiom of
the coequal constitutional status of the branches. Unless the Constitu-
tion specifies a rule making the President subordinate to the orders of
the judiciary, either generally or in some specific situation applicable
to the case at hand, Bates's conclusion surely follows logically from
294 See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
295 10 Op. Att'y Gen. at 76-77.
296 Id. at 85.
297 REHNQUIST, supra note 278, at 44.
298 Id.
299 See supra note 293.
300 REHNQUIST, supra note 278, at 44.
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correct premises. 30 1 Rehnquist's. only argument, if one can call it that,
is that "[t] his proposition had been refuted by Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Marbuy v. Madison more than half a century earlier.
30 2
That's a whopper, but a familiar one: the canard that Marshall's
opinion in Marbury v. Madison03 asserted judicial supremacy has been
refuted by constitutional scholars dozens of times, yet the myth
endures-constitutional law's equivalent of the Creature from the
Black Lagoon. 30 4 Marbury does not claim judicial supremacy; and
even if it did, the judiciary's assertion of supremacy (which the Court
has made, but only in modern times305) would not qualify as a refuta-
tion of Bates's argument, but only as a self-interested contradiction of
it. Ironically, the making of the claim seems almost to validate the
correctness of Bates's opinion.
The Menyman confrontation was the apex of Lincoln's stance
against judicial supremacy. More than anything he said against the
prospective binding political authority of Dred Scott, more than any-
thing he said in the campaigns of 1858 and 1860; more than anything
he said in his First Inaugural; what Lincoln did in defying Taney's
order in Mernyman demonstrated the true implications of Lincoln's
position on judicial authority. Judicial decisions were not law of the
land, binding on national policy, and they were not necessarily bind-
ing in the particular case, either. To be sure, one can fairly argue that
these were extreme circumstances calling for extreme responses. Lin-
coln's defiance is arguably the only true instance of presidential asser-
tion and exercise of a claimed presidential power forthrightly to
refuse to execute judicial decrees. But principles, and their limits, are
often defined, or refined, in the crucible of extreme tests. At any rate,
as a historical matter the reality is undeniable: when push came to
shove, Lincoln went all-in against the proposition of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation. Judicial decisions do not
301 As I have explained and discussed elsewhere, the only plausible candidate for
such a specific, trump-everyone interpretive power lies in the powers ofjuries set forth
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra
note 6, at 288-92.
302 REHNQUIST, supra note 278, at 44.
303 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
304 See Paulsen, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 6, at 2706-24; Paulsen, The Most Dan-
gerous Branch, supra note 6, at 225-26 n.19, 244-45.
305 See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 6, at 225 n.18 (collecting
modern Supreme Court cases making, or repeating, this judicial assertion). William
Rehnquist's most notable assertion of this claim came in his opinion for the Court, as
Chief Justice, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (2000) ("[E]ver
since Marbury, this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional
text.").
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bind the independent constitutional judgment, and action, of other
actors in the constitutional system.
After Mernyman, Lincoln's defiance, as President, of the prospec-
tive authority of Dred Scott with respect to government policy concern-
ing the status of blacks as citizens and the power of Congress to
prohibit slavery in the territories almost became easy cases. The final
set of examples of Lincoln's mature position all involve Dred-defying
acts.
C. Defying Dred Scott
It is appropriate that the final pieces of data bearing on Lincoln's
stance toward judicial authority involve the case that pushed Lincoln
down this path in the first place, Dred Scott. Not to put too fine a point
on it, once the war came, Lincoln and Congress defied the authority
of Dred Scott as in any way limiting the power of the government on
the points of law the Court decided.
First and most striking is what Congress and Lincoln did with
respect to Dred Scott's holding that Congress could not prohibit slavery
in the territories. Once Lincoln became President and the reality of
civil war removed the brakes of political accommodation, they disre-
garded the decision and passed legislation flying in the face of the
Court's holding. Following Lincoln's line denying any authoritative
status to the Court's decision as a rule governing political conduct,
Congress flatly banned slavery in all federal territories, even though
the Dred Scott decision clearly purported to prescribe a general consti-
tutional rule that such legislation was an unconstitutional interference
with Fifth Amendment (substantive) "due process" rights of slavehold-
ers in their slave property.
3 0 6
This legislation was passed by Congress and signed into law by
President Lincoln in June 1862, a year into the war.3 0 7 As Professor
David Currie reported, Congress borrowed directly from the North-
west Ordinance for its language prohibiting slavery "immediately,
eternally, and without reservation." 308 After a more extended debate
over prohibiting slavery in the District of Columbia, the prohibition of
slavery in the territories was enacted with relatively little discussion.
"Strikingly," Currie wrote, "no one so much as mentioned the Dred
Scott case, which had struck down a provision indistinguishable from
306 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-51 (1857).
307 Act of June 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432.
308 Currie, supra note 218, at 1147.
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the one just proposed, let alone explained why the decision was
wrong."
3 09
Yet the plain fact is that the new ban was unconstitutional if Dred
Scott was controlling law. The statute was Congress's-and Lin-
coln's-legislative rejection of the Supreme Court's definitive consti-
tutional interpretation in Dred Scott. Indeed, it would not be far off to
say that Congress had, by legislation, purported to overrule the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Of course, no
case was ever brought challenging the act in the courts; matters were
rapidly being overtaken by events. The true resolution of these differ-
ences took place on the battlefields of the Civil War, not in any court
of law. 310 But it is instructive that Lincoln and Congress believed, not
merely in the abstract, but with their actions, that the Supreme
Court's decision was not binding upon them in the exercise of their
constitutional powers. And they evidently believed it so strongly and
confidently that they did not even need to discuss the effect of the
Court's decision on their own constitutional judgments. There is no
anguished handwringing over the authority of the Supreme Court in
constitutional interpretation. There is simply the act of repudiating
the Court's ruling.
Less dramatically, but equally defiantly, Lincoln's administration
granted patents and visas to black citizens-a legal requirement for
receiving such privileges-in the teeth of Dred Scott's citizenship hold-
ing that blacks could not be United States citizens under the Constitu-
tion.311 Once again, if Dred Scott was controlling law, such executive
action was unconstitutional. And once again Lincoln's actions thus
stand in unmistakable conflict with the assumption that the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Constitution are binding on the
President.3 1 2
309 Id. at 1149-50.
310 See Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6, at 691.
311 Letter fromJ. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State, to William Marcy, Secretary
of State (Nov. 4, 1856), in 5 THE WORs OF CHARLES SUMNER 497, 497-98 (Boston,
Lee & Shepard 1872); Colby, supra note 219, at 1053; Easterbrook, supra note 134, at
926.
312 Historian Doris Kearns Goodwin collates reports of another Dred-defying legal
position taken by the Lincoln administration. Well into the war, Attorney General
Bates issued a legal opinion addressing the question whether a commercial schooner
in the coastal trade lawfully could be captained by a black man. Naval law required
that an American flag vessel be commanded by an American citizen, and Dred Scott
had held that blacks could not be American citizens. Bates concluded that citizenship
was governed by place of birth, not color of skin-announcing the rule that eventu-
ally would be embodied in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment-not-
withstanding the decision in Dred Scott. Writes Goodwin of this Bates opinion: "The
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The third and final example is dramatic-and famous. Lincoln's
Emancipation Proclamation, a military order seizing an enemy
resource pursuant to his military authority as Commander in Chief,313
was probably unconstitutional if Dred Scott was valid, binding law. The
matter is perhaps not entirely free from doubt; one could certainly
argue that federal government confiscation of slave property ordinarily
would have been a violation of the Due Process Clause under Dred
Scott (and perhaps also an uncompensated taking to boot), but that
the circumstances of armed military conflict brought such action
within the scope of the war power, at least during the period of the
conflict. 3 14 Nonetheless, it is difficult to avoid the force of the claim
that military emancipation of slaves within states that Lincoln vigor-
ously claimed remained states within the United States of America
conflicted rather sharply with Dred Scott. If it were true that white citi-
zens in federal territories possessed a constitutional right to own
slaves, protected against national legislative interference, it surely was
a fortiori true that white citizens possessed a constitutional right to
own slaves in states whose laws explicitly permitted and protected the
institution.
Yet history is plain that, while Lincoln considered questions of his
legal authority to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, those ques-
tions for him concerned the proper scope of presidential military
power-that is, the breadth of the Commander in Chief Clause
power-and of the authority that flowed from presidential war power
to seize resources in enemy territory. 315 But nary a word was spoken
about the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott
concerning the constitutional right to slave property, free of federal
interference. By the time Lincoln proclaimed emancipation, the
Court's decision in Dred Scott simply was not regarded as relevant to
the question of Lincoln's constitutional authority to make such an
order.3 1
6
Dred Scott decision was wrong; free blacks were citizens of the United States." GoOD-
WIN, supra note 174, at 674.
313 Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 221, at 424 (invoking the
President's authority as military Commander in Chief).
314 Paulsen, supra note 220, at 814-23.
315 See ALLEN C. GUEZELO, LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 190-212
(2004); MCPHERSON, supra note 64, at 504; WILSON, supra note 48, at 105-42; Paulsen,
supra note 220, at 823-31.
316 As to Southern slaveowners not supporting the rebellion-that is, those who in
theory remained loyal to the United States-the Emancipation Proclamation arguably
constituted a seizure of citizens' private property for military use, without specific leg-
islative authorization and without compensation. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (invalidating President Truman's
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In his First Inaugural, in his defiance of Taney in Merryman, and
with his complete repudiation of Dred Scott through legislation, admin-
istrative action, and emancipation, Lincoln carried into action-and
carried through to their logical end-his constitutional views that
judicial decisions contrary to the Constitution could not bind political
authorities in the exercise of their independent constitutional judg-
ment. Lincoln had, in the years from 1857 to 1864, progressed from a
theory ofjudicial precedent that accorded weight, but not controlling
authority, to court decisions; to a view that judicial decisions had no
binding weight on political actors outside the particular case decided;
to a thoroughgoing separation-of-powers perspective that denied
absolute authority to any judicial decision, even the judgment in a
particular case.
It is impossible to reconcile the dominant modern perspective of
judicial supremacy with Lincoln's fully developed constitutional views
on judicial authority. This lengthy survey shows an irrepressible con-
flict between the two. One or the other simply has to be judged
wrong. Which is it?
V. CODA
2008 marks both the sesquicentennial of the Lincoln-Douglas
debates and the golden anniversary of Cooper v. Aaron,317 decided in
1958. The world little notes-but should long remember-the ironic
affinity of these two constitutional landmarks separated by a century.
Surely the lost lesson of Lincoln, first developed at length in his Sen-
ate campaign, is the stunning wrongness of the claim of complete
judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation-the equating of
the decisions of the Supreme Court with the Constitution itself.
The claim is legally wrong: it is inconsistent both with the limited
nature ofjudicial power generally and with the bedrock conception of
separation of powers that forbids any one branch of the national gov-
ernment from controlling the constitutional judgments of the other
two. It is inconsistent with democracy-with the right of the people
independently to interpret their Constitution through all the avenues
of popular, republican government subject to their direct and indirect
control, including legislative bodies, executive bodies, judicial bodies,
and juries. And it is inconsistent with the reality of willful, monstrous
judicial error, most pressingly illustrated by Dred Scott. Unless it is
wartime seizure of the domestic steel production industry); id. at 631 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that steel seizure involved an uncompensated taking of pri-
vate property).
317 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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assumed that the Supreme Court can do no wrong by the Constitu-
tion-an assumption rendered impossible by the reality of Dred Scott
(and confirmed, repeatedly, throughout the Court's history by other
atrocious cases)-judicial supremacy simply cannot be squared with
the supremacy of the Constitution. To defer, reflexively, to the
Court's decisions, is to acquiesce, more than occasionally, to a betrayal
of the Constitution, often with grave moral and human consequences.
To accept judicial supremacy would be to have accepted the Court's
assertion that the black race is so inferior as to have no rights that the
white race is bound to respect, and that blacks justly could be reduced
to slavery for their own benefit. To accept judicial supremacy would
be to have accepted a second Dred Scott decision requiring every state
in the Union to have tolerated slavery within its limits. To acceptjudi-
cial supremacy would be to have accepted judicial declaration of a
plenary federal constitutional right to slavery. To accept judicial
supremacy would be to have accepted a judicial decision forbidding
federal interference with a state's secession from the Union. In short,
judicial supremacy, 150 years ago, meant accepting constitutional
rights to slavery and secession.
A century, a Civil War, Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and two world
wars later, Cooper reaffirmed Brown v. Board of Education's318 rejection
of racial segregation, the ugly illegitimate grandchild of the white
supremacist thinking that had produced Dred Scott. Cooper's greatness
lay in its unanimous reaffirmation of correct constitutional principle
and in its condemnation of resistance to that principle. In that sense,
Cooper echoed Lincoln. But, ironically, in so doing the Court in Cooper
overreached and asserted precisely the claim of judicial supremacy
that Lincoln rejected a century before. The Court in 1958 echoed
Stephen Douglas in 1858, equating its decisions with the Constitution
itself and-exactly as Douglas did-condemning resistance to
Supreme Court opinions as resistance to the Constitution itself.
31 9
318 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
319 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (claiming that Marbury established the proposition "that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" and
that "that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system"). That assertion,
or others like it, has become something of a staple of Supreme Court opinions, usu-
ally signaling the Court's need to make up in boldness what its opinion may lack in
persuasiveness. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Con-
gress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Con-
stitution."); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (2000) ("[Elver since
Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.");
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) ("[T]he Court [is]
invested with the authority to decide [the people's] constitutional cases and speak
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The Court did not (and has not since) recognized the irony that
it was claiming for itself, in the context of a good cause, what Douglas
and the South had claimed for the Court, in the context of a bad one.
The claim ofjudicial supremacy must be right, or wrong, irrespective of
context. Imagine for example that 1958 had seen, instead of Brown as
it was actually decided, a reaffirmation of Plessy or even a judicial
order mandating segregation of the races. Suppose, in this alternative
world, Cooper declared the Court's decisions interpreting the Constitu-
tion to be on par with the Constitution itself and declared resistance
to those decisions unlawful. Under the reasoning of the real Cooper,
that proclamation, too, though wrong on the merits, would have been
right in its exposition of judicial authority, and binding on all other
actors within the constitutional system. Can this possibly be right?
Would modern defenders ofjudicial supremacy really embrace such a
result?
Against the vision of Cooper stands the vision of Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln did not disrespect the judicial role. But he had a realistic
understanding of the possibility of grave judicial wrongdoing-real-
ism born of the reality of Dred Scott. This understanding ultimately
drove him to the conclusion that judicial supremacy-the claim that
the Court's decisions on constitutional questions bind the other two
branches of government and the political and constitutional judg-
ments of the people-was fundamentally inconsistent with constitu-
tional government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
Judicial supremacy was, for Lincoln, a peculiar species of despotism.
It was a betrayal of the Constitution.
Lincoln's legacy likewise confronts constitutional thought today
with a stark choice. The widely accepted, but typically unexamined,
notion ofjudicial supremacy is either right or wrong. If, with Douglas,
we affirm that it is right, then there is nothing that properly may stand
in the way of the Supreme Court's erroneous, and even willfully
wrong, interpretations of the Constitution. One might think Dred
Scott wrong, but to act on that thought, in politics or government, is
itself wrong (with, perhaps, the narrow exception of seeking to
appoint to the Supreme Court persons who hold one's view of the
wrongness of the decision). One cannot accept judicial supremacy
before all others for their constitutional ideals."); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
549 (1969) ("[I]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("Deciding whether a
matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has
been committed .... is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution."). The claim has not gained persuasiveness by its repetition.
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without accepting the duty to accept, enforce, and embrace Dred Scott
or any other judicial atrocity the Supreme Court might inflict upon
the Constitution and upon the nation whose Constitution it is.
But if, with Lincoln, we think this notion of judicial supremacy
wrong, then there is nothing wrong with resistance, through all availa-
ble legal means, to Supreme Court decisions that one in good faith
believes improper. The Constitution is not the exclusive province of
the Supreme Court. The Court's decisions are not the Constitution.
And neither the Supreme Court nor any other authority properly may
declare resistance to judicial decisions to be illegitimate. Quite the
reverse: the assertion of judicial supremacy is fundamentally incom-
patible with the American constitutional order.
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